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PREFACE
This report was prepared by the Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, Long Beach, California, under Contract NASI-16111. It is the
final technical report covering the review of survivable transport aircraft
accidents, the association between structural systems and accident injuries
and the identification of typical scenarios. This report also includes a
review of the five volumes of the "Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide", an
overview of crash testing techniques and test reconwnendations,an overview and
recommendations for analytical techniques and advanced material usage. This
work was conducted between February 11, 1980 and May 26, 1981.
The followingDouglas personnel were the principal contributors to the study:
E. Albano Crash Analysis and Test
A. Cominsky Principal Investigator
J. Gaume Human Factors
H. Leve Crash Analysis
M. Platte Systems Analysis
H. Toellner Advanced Materials
R. Reibold Testing
The project was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), Langley Research Center. Dr. Robert G. Thompson was the project
engineer for NASA.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
The United States is a leader in the design and production of large commercial
aircraft. The aircraft produced by the aircraft industry have been improved
continuously because of the industry's concern for reliability and safety.
Government regulatory and research activities share in the interest of
improved services and increased safety for the public.
The purpose of this study was to investigate transport impact tolerance and to
: study the possibility of improving passenger and crew safety in transport
aircraft. The structural integrity of the fuselage during a survivable impact
was the pri,aaryconcern.
The modern commercial aircraft requires maximum safety; however, new
protective features must be justified by an increased level of safety with a
minimum of added complexity, weight and operational constraints.
During the period 1959-1979, there were approximately 580 worldwide transport
aircraft accidents which prov;ded the source of the data base for this study.
This study tended to confine itseif co an examination of the modern jet of
27,200 kg (60,000 lb.) ane up and non-turbulence survivable accidents.
Thus, only approach, landing and rejected takeoff accidents were studied.
These comprise 60% of all accidents which occurred in about 6% of the total
operational time. The data base of this study is given in Appendix A !n which
112 survivable accidents are listed in three categories.
The data base was examined and summarized in Section 6 and Appendix B.
Typical accident scer_rios were developed from this data for possible use as
future design and test instruments.
I-1
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Advanced materials and processes are playing increasing roles i, future
transport designs. Their potential impact properties are discussed, and steps
needed to fill in the gaps in impact tolera,ce applications are suggested.
An evaluation of the "U. S. Army Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide" was
carried out to determine possib;e application to airline transport a_rcraft.
Various indices and criteria for relating impact acceleration with human
tolerance _ith the intention of judging human survival were studied and
evaluated.
A review of impact scenarios from the data base was carried cut to identify
'; major structural components which were involved in typical accidents.
Existing analytical techniques were evaluated and s_ggestions put forward for
developing simple, economical and possibly more accurate procedures.
Established test techniques were reviewed and a test program was outlined for
providing data to assist in the development of simplified analysis techniques.
I-2
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SECTION 2
SUMMARY
Format - 2.1 Data Base and Scenario Candidates
2.2 Characteristicsof Scenario Candidates
2.3 Generalized Impact Scenarios
2.4 Advanced Materials Assessment
2.5 Aircraft Crash Survival Design L_Ide
2.6 Human Tolerance to Impact
2.7 Merit Functlons
2.8 Analytical Methods
2.9 Test Methods
2.1 DATA BASE AND SCENARIO CANDIDATES
The accident data base for this study consists of I12 impact survivable
transport aircraft accidents (world wide) that are listed :n Appendix A.
These were principally jet transport aircraft of 27,200 k9 (60,000 lb.)
and up. This study centered on the effect of impact on aircraft
stm_-ture. Thus, the study was ce-fined to appre_ch, landing and takeoff
flight segments. Accidents confined to flight turbulence, taxiing and
parking were eliminated.
2.2 CHARACTERISTICSOF SCENARIO CANDIDATES
The welt documented accidents were studied to record significant
characteristics, their frequency of occurrence, and effect on passenger
injury. The details resulting from this review are listed in the three
tables of Appendix B.
It was concluded that the condition of the fuselage shell and the cabin
interior had a direct bearing on passenger impact injury. Other factors
such as engine separation, landing gear separation and wing tank rupture
were important because they led to fuel spill and a fuel fed fire which
was a prime threat to passengers.
2-I
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2.3 GENERALIZED IMPACT SCENARIOS
Generalized Impact Scenarios (GIS) are presented for landing and
rejected takeoff accident categories. These scenarios were developed
from data averages as well as from typical accidents and are confined to
that data which affects the behavior of the structure during impact.
The Generalized Landing Mode Scenario consists of meteorological data
and a description of the aircraft from just prior to impact through the
slide to when the wreckage comes to a i_alt. This scenario contains two
divisions:
/ A) Touchdown short of the runway
B) Touchdown on the runway
The Generalized Rejected Takeoff Mode Scenario co,lsists of
meteorologicaldata and a description of the aircraft from the beginning
of the takeoff roll through the runway overrun to when the wreckage
comes to a halt. This scenario contains three divisions:
A) Long runway overrun
B) Short runway overrun
C) Halted on the airport
2.4 ASSESSMENT OF ADVANCED MATERIALS
An assessment of advanced structural materials and advanced fabrication
processes was made in Section 7. The materials were grouped into three
categories:
I. Aluminum Alloys
2. Metal Matrix Materials
3. Advanced Composites
: 2-2
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qThe processes were grouped into five categories:
I. Bonding
2. Diffusion Bonded/SuperplasticFormed Titanium
3. Large Castings
4. Filament Winding
5. Trapped Rubber
Benefits and limitations of these materials and processes were discussed
and attention was drawn to those materials and processes with
substantial future promise.
2.5 AIRCRAFT CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE
This Design Guide comes in five volumes which are numbers I through 5 in
the List of References. These reports present the state-of-the-art for
impact survival design for use in design of army helicopters and
lightweight general aviation aircraft. These reports were reviewed to
determine possible application to transport aircraft design.
2.6 HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT
A survey was carried out of many indices and criteria that have been
proposed for giving an indication of the degree of passenger injury
during an impact sequence. These indices apply to spine, head, leg and
arm injuries. This type of data is important to the evaluation of
impact tolerance Df future transport aircraft designs.
2.7 MERIT FUNCTIONS
1 merit function evaluation is a useful method for comparing the
degree of merit of competing safety concepts. The parameters that are
useful for evaluating the merit function fall into three categories:
cost, effectiveness and societal concerns. The elements of these
parameters are described within.
2-3
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2.8 ANALYTICAL METHODS
Considerable Research and Development is being carried on within NASA
and the aircraft manufacturing companies toward developing computer
analyses capable of describing the dynamic behavior of an aircraft
(including structural deformation, acceleration, stresses and failure,
as well as the forces and accelerations acting on the passengers and
crew) subjected to an impact sequence of an accident scenario.
A review of three such computer analysis programs is presented in
Section 11.0. These were the Krash, Dycast and Somla programs. Krash
models the aircraft structure as a system of masses, springs and
dashpots. This analysis method is well documented and is potentially
well suited to describe large aircraft impact sequence simulation, i
Dycast models the aircraft structure in great detail as a number of
finite elements, but its size may render it too complex for complete
aircraft usage. It may, however, be very useful for application to
local portions of a structure.
Somla confines its analysis to the occupant and seat structure. The
occupant is a mass/spring/dashpotsystem while the seat is modelled by a
finite element system and works quite well.
Comments on analytical requirements and recommendatior of impact
analysis programs are also presented.
2.g TEST METHODS
This section consists of a review of full scale aircraft structure
impact type tests that have already been carried out. This section also
deals with recommendationsfor future tests.
2-4
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There are two full scale large transport aircraft impact tests that were
carried out sixteen years ago. These consisted of a DC7 and a lockheed
Constellation, both propeller powered aircraft. The aircraft structure,
equipment and dummies were well instrumented, and the resulting test
data was very significant. The remainder of the tests and the results
were only available for light general aviation aircraft and helicopters.
The objectives of future tests are considered to he:
I) Verify the accuracy of existing impact analysis programs
2) Provide impact data results for several sizes of aircraft
3) Pruvide data for use in developing simplified agalysis
; methods of impact scenarios
4) Help to establish the impact capabilities of existing metal
jet aircraft to establish levels of excellence for future
advanced composite aircraft structures
5) Test out structural improvements by which impact tolerance
could be improved.
A recommended test program to be carried out in the future is described
in Section 12.0. Five categories of tests were described with the
conclusion that:
Testing of structural subsystems could provide needed test
results at economical costs. An extensive t_st program
involving the use of structural subsystem specimens
obtained from salvage sources is suggested to provide data
for recommended follow on studies.
2-5
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SECTION 3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Format - 3.1.0 Conclusions
3.2.0 Recommendations
3.2.1 Scenario Candidates
3.2.2 Advanced Materials
3.2.3 U.S. Army Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide
3.2.4 Human Tolerance To Impact
3.2.5 Analytical Methods
? 3.2.6 Test Methods
3./.0 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions resulting from this study are:
I) The limited number of domestic and foreign transport
aircraft survivable accidents and related passenger
injuries over an eighteen year period (1961-1979) is an
indication of the limited potential for impact tolerance
improvement for metal aircraft.
2) Aircraft impact during the approach flight mode is
equivalent to the aircraft flying into the ground and, as
such, is too severe to constitute a practical design goal.
3) There are 50 percent more fire fatalities than impact
trauma fatalities for survivable !andin- :nd takeoff mode
accidents. Thus, post impact fire accidents are prime
candidates for survivability improvement studies.
3-I
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4) Nineteen out of forty-five survivable accidents involved
light to heavy rain during survivable approach, landing and
takeoff maneuvers. The avoidance of heavy rain situations
especially during final approach and landing would reduce
the probability that a pilot will encounter conditions
which make aircraft control difficult. On-board radar
makes this feasible.
5) Areas for research and development for aircraft impact
tolerance improvement are:
o landing gear attachments
o engine attachment
o wing tank structure
o fuserage structure and equipment
6) The "U. S. Army Crash Survival Design Guide" (Refere,.c_sI
through 5) provides a unique general aid to impact tolerant
structural design with overwhelming emphasis to helicopters
and light fixed wing aircraft. It is a good source of
design methodology as in the definition of impact conditions
in terms of acceleration versus time pulses (Reference
Figure E-tO). The treatment of design considerations for
impact tolerant seats is comprehensive. A useful approach
to impact tolerant structural design may be accomplished by
expressing static strength requirements in terms of bounds
on loads versus deformation curves (Reference Figures E-I!
and E-12).
7) Available data concerning human tolerance to impact is
primarily related to Air Forc,_ejection seat design and
thus should not be carried over to the transport passenger
who exhibits a wide range in size, weight, age, physical
condition and degree of restraint.
-2 Itm.
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8) It is important that development continue on advanced
impact dynamics analysis programs such as KRASH and DYCAST
particularly in the area of large transport modelling.
These will be needed as design assist and design
verification tools.
3.2.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
3.2.1 SCENARIO CANDIDATES
The data base consists of 112 impact survivable transport
aircraft accidents which are grouDed into three categories,
; namely: approach, landing, and rejected takeoff modes. The
typical approach mode accident occurs as the aircraft impacts
the ground while proceeding along the glide slope at approach
speed. This is a very severe accident scenario as can be seen
in Table 4-3, page 4-4. The fire and impact trauma fatalities
are the largest of the three accident modes.
It is considered that the typical approach accident is not a
practical candidate as a basis for aircraft design. The landing
and rejected takeoff scenarios of Section 6 are proposed as
potential scenario candidates which should be subjected to
examination and analysis to determine the practicality of the
magnitudes ef the loads, accelerations, impact and failure
sequence which result from these scenarios.
3.2.2 ADVANCED MATERIALS
A survey of advanced materials and processes is given in
Section 7. It is conceded that the new aluminum alloys should
exhibit similar impact tolerance as aluminums that are in use
today. However, questions about the behavior of metal matrix
and advanced composites in hi-energy impact situations have not
yet been answered.
3-3
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It is recommended that a program should be initiated to study
the following:
I. Post buckllnq behavior of laminated composite structure
2. Complex failure modes (unoer impact loading)
3. Material flammablllty
4. Thermal decomposition (I.e., noxious gases, smoke
evaluation and human tolerance)
5. Service life degradation prior to an accident
The program to study the high energy impact tolerance potential
of metal matrix and advanced composites could consist of the
following steps:
I) Establish practical design composites concepts
2) Analyze the design concepts using material properties
3) Fabricate subcomponent specimens
4) Subject the specimens to test
5) Compare the test results with predictions and compare the
impact behavior of the candidate materials with the
baseline aluminum specimens.
The types of tests to be considered for this program are the
following:
A) "Head on collision" for which the specimen would resemble a
section of fuselage
B) "Vertical drop" for which the specimen would resemble t_?
underbelly of an aircraft
C) "Abrasion"with a specimen as for test B)
D) "Sparking" with a specimen as for test B)
3-4
1982014353-021
• * °
The advanced material candidates for semi-scaie testing:
1. Aluminum for baseline
2. Graphite/epoxycomposites
Rigidite 5208/T300 for baseline
CIBA #4/T300
BP 907/T300
, 3. Thermoplastic resin
Peek resin/T300
New resin
4. Two polyimide/graphitesystems
5. Kevlar/epoxy
/ 6. Boron/aluminum
7. Graphite/aluminum
8. Large alumin_ castings
3.2.3 U. S, ARMY AIRCRAFT CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE
It is clear that overwhelming emphasis in the Design Guide is
given to helicopters and to a lesser degree, light fixed wing
aircraft. Therefore, it is recommended that a very worthwhile
effort could consist of developing a commercial transport
aircraft equivalent to the U. S. Army Design Guide.
3.2.4 HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT
Since the available human tolerance data is Air Forc_ personnel
oriented, it is recommended that a careful study to establish a
definitive set of injury criteria for transport impact tolerance
application be carried out. This would be an important
contribution toward transport impact tolerance evaluation.
3-5
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3.2.5 ANALYTICAL METHOD_
It is recommended that workshops should be set up to provide
opportunity for gaining experience in the use of KRASH, DYCAST
and SOMLA for those that have not participated in their
developme_it.
A significant effort should be devoted to the formulation of
simplified analysis approaches which serve prellminary design
and parametric variation study purposes.
One concept to consider is the application of shaped
; acceleration pulses at the base of the occupant's seat. It
would be necessary to first establish a proper set of pulse_.
A second concept could involve modelling most of the aircraft hy
means of flexible mode shapes. The model would use non-linear
elements below the fuselage floor and could account for moderate
impact pulses. The structuralmodel should contain less than 50
degrees of freedom and the execution CPU time should be less
than 1,000 times real time.
3.2.6 TEST METHODS
It is recommended that a test program be carried out to:
o Provide basic data for developing simplified methods of
impact analysis.
o Verify/ existing analysis methods and the proposed
simplifiedmethods.
o Provide knowledge and visual evidence of aircraft structure
failure in progress.
3-6
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Tests performed with structural subsystem specimens provide the
greatest promise for leading to improved impact tolerance.
Structural components of many current aircraft are available at
a reasonable cost from salvage yards.
The impact tolerance of an aircraft is primarily dependent on
the performance of these three structural components:
I) Landing gear and wing
2) Fuselage underbelly
3) Seat and support structure
The types of tests to be performed on these specimens are listed
and described in Section _.2.2.4and Appendix D.
3-7
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!SECTION 4
ACCIDENT DATA BASE
The accident data base was obtained from
I. NTSB data tapes called the "System of On-Line Analysis Retrieval of
Accident Data (SOLARAD). This computer data bank has accident and
incident data from the period 1964 to 1978 that are categorized and
sorted.
2. ICAO and World Airline Accident Summaries
Two listings of jet aircraft accidents were extracted from SOLARAD tapes. One
listing extracted all fatal accidents for jets of 27200 kg (60,000 lb.) and
up. This produced an output of 92 accidents. The other listing extracted
accidents with only serious injuries. This produced an output of 297
accidents.
Accidents which involved only minor damage, air turbulence, mlnor injury or
were non-survivable were discarded. The remaining substantial damage,
fatal/serious injury accidents comprise the accident data base of 112
accidents and are listed in Appendix A.
An impact-survivable accident in this analysis is defined as an accident in
which all occupants did not receive _dtal injuries as a result of impact
forces imposed during the crash sequence. An accident is classified as a
fatal accident if one or more occupants received fatal injuries. Substantial
damage is damage which adversely affects the structural strength, performance,
or flight characteristics of the aircraft and which would normally require
replacement or major repair unless the accident results in destruction of the
aircraft. Several fatal accidents involving an initial non-fatal occurrence
resulting in substantial damage and a subsequent non-survivable impact or
fatal event are included in the survivable or non-fatal categories because the
damage resulting from the initial impact was of interest from an impact
tolerance viewpoin+ and also because the subsequent impact or event might have
been prevented had the effect of the initial damage b_en minimized.
4-I
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Aircraft accidents occur on or off the airport during a landing, takeoff, taxi
or parked mode. The taxi/park type of accident is generally not very serious
and was eliminated from further consideration. T"_us, the accident data base
to be studied was organized into three categories a_cording to the flight mode
of the aircraft prior to the impact. These categories were
I) Approach
2) Landing
3) Rejected Takeoff (RTO)
Approach accidents occur while the aircraft is descending on approach before
reaching the airport. This flight mode is generally characterized by flight
along or near the glide slope with approach speed, power, flaps, and gross
weight with landing gear down. Impact can be with trees, level or sloping
ground, ditch, embankment, dike, water, vehicles, buildings or light support
structures. These accidents are numbered I-I to 1-114 in Table A-I of
Appendix A.
Landing accidents occur when the aircraft touches down on or near the runway,
_nd overruns or veers off the runway after tsuchdown. This flight mode is
characterized by flared-out flight with landing speed, power, flaps, and gross
weight with landing gear down. These accidents are numbered 2-0 to 2-113 in
Table A-2 of Appendix A.
Takeoff accidents occur while the aircraft is moving on the runway for takeoff
or after liftoff prior to retracting the landing gear and flaps. A tire or
engine failure usually occurs. The wheel or engine braking action is thus
reduced and asymmetrical, and the aircraft overruns the airport runway. These
accidents are numbered 3-0 to 3-127 in Table A-3 Appendix A.
The data base includes principally domestic aircraft in the service of
domestic and foreign airlines. This study applied only to transport category
aircraft in commercial service certified to FAR PART 25.
4-2
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Good documentation is needed for a useful study of an accident. NTSB has
jurisdiction over domestic accidents hut not those occurring in foreign
countries. NTSB Blue Book accident reports was the prf-cipal source of
information for this study. Since the availability of good documentation is
so vital to the pursuit of this study, the well documented accidents we.re
identified to reveal this. The identification system is shown In Table 4-1.
l ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION
ACCIDENT I TOTAL
CATEGORY WELL BARE NUMBER
DOCUMENTED DOCUMENTATION
APPROACH I-1 TO 1-12 1-101 TO 1-114 26
: LANDING 2-0 TO 2-15 2-101 TO 2-113 35
REJECTED 3-0 TO 3-10 3-!01 TO 3-127 44
I TAKEOFF
TO]AL NUMBER 48 57 I0_
TABLE 4-I: ACCIDENT CATEGORY IDENTIFICATIONAND
QUALITY OF DOCUMENTATION
The Ten_riffe accident (March 27, 1977) is not included among the Rejected
Takeoff accidents data base. This accident involved the ground collision of
two Boeing 747 aircraft and is considered as non-survivable due to the
destruction of the fuselage shell of both aircraft during the collision. The
casualty figures for this accident are in Table 4-2.
IMPACT
TOTAL NONE/MINOR SE_'IOUS TRAUMA FIRE
AIRLINE ABOARD INJURY INJURY FATALITY FATALITY
(T) (N/M) (S) (I.T.) (F)
KI.M 248 0 0 50 198
PAN AM 396 36 34 134 )92
TABLE 4-2: TENERIFFE ACCIDENT, PASSENGERS AND CREW
CASUALTY STATISTICS
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World transport casualty _tatistics for s_irvivableaccidents occurring during
the 1960 to 1980 period are given in Table 4-3.
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS AND CREW
NUMBER
ACCIDENT OF NONE/ SERIOUS +F'AI_ALITIES
GROUP ACCIDENTS TOTAL MINOR IMPACT
TOTAL TRAUMA FIRE DROWNING
I. APPROACH 27 2,113 550 287 1035 434 298 0
2. LANDING 33 3,058 1.581 352 421 157 227 0
3. TAKEOFF 49 4,798 3,6_i 352 379 92 146 78
I'OTAL 109 10,069 5,732 991 1,835 683 671 78
FIGURE 4-3: INJURY SURVEY - SURVIVABLE ACCIDENTS -
PERIOD 1960 TO 1980, COMMERCIAL
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.
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SECTION 5
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACT SCENARIO CANDIDATES
One of the principal objectives of this study was the development of
generalized impact scenarios (GIS) representative of typical survivable
aircraft accidents. The data base chosen for this development was the well
documented accidents identified in Table 4-I.
The first step was to extract accident related data to show
I) a list of significant accident characteristics
2) the frequency of occurrence of the significant accident
'_ characteristics.
3) the relationship between the a_cident characteristics and the
aircraft occupant injuries.
4) typical or average values for accident characteristics where
appropriate.
For these purposes, a matrix of impact characteristics derived from the
reference documents listed in Tables B-I, B-2 and B-3 was prepared for each of
the three accident categories; approach, landing and takeoff and are presented
in Appendix B. The approach and landing characteristics matrices (Tables B-I
and B-2) are similar and each contain 94 charac'ceristicsarranged in seven
groups shown in Table 5-I.
The rejected takeoff n_atrix(Table B-3) contains 120 characteristics arranged
in the seven groups also shown in Table 5-I.
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CHARACTERISTICGROUP
APPROACH & LANDING
SCENARIOS TAKEOFF SCENARIOS
1 PASSENGERS & CREW PASSENGERS & CREW
2 SUBSYSTEMS SUBSYSTEMS
3 APPROACH & IMPACT RUNWAY TAKEOFF RUN
; 4 TERRAIN & AIRCRAFT SLIDE RUNWAY OVERRUN &
AIRCRAFT SLIDE
5 METEOROLIGICAL METEOROLOGICAL
INFORMATION INFORMATION
TABLE 5-1: ACCIDENT SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICSGROUPS
The following data is given in the botton seven rows of each matrix.
I) the frequency of occurrence of the significant impact characteristics
2) the numbers of serious injuries, impact and fire fatalities for the
accidents which experienced the given significant impact
characteristic.
This accident frequency aridinjury data helped to provide some indication of
the seriousness of each characteristic.
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To facilitate the location of the information about an accident characteristic
within the matrix and also to emphasize the importance of time during the fire
and evacuation periods, some of the accident groups are listed chronologi-
cally. These are the third, fourth, fifth and sixth groups of th_se shown in
Table 5-I.
The approach impact characteristics for thirteen scenario candidates are
recorded in Table B-I. The serious structural failures and related results
are shown in Table 5-2.
.... NUMBER OF INJURIES FOR
NUMBER ASSOCIATED ACCIDENTS
STRUCTURE OF SERIOUS FATALITIES
ACCIDENTS INJURIES IMPACT TRAUMA--__
(SI), (I.T_F..) . (F.F.),
ENGINE II 186 2£9 182
SEPARATION
LANDING GEAR 10 168 163 144
SEPARATION
TANK 7 159 257 164
RUPTURE
FUSELAGE 8 136 293 135
BREAKS
SEAT 9 155 275 146
FAILURES
REFERENCE TABLE B-1
TABLE 5-2: APPROACH ACCIDENTS, CHARACTERISTICS& INJURY SUMMARIES
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The average airspeed equals 146 Kn. ar,dthe average rate of descent equals
7.,95 m/s (26.1 fps). There were ten fire accidents associated with
146 S.I.'s, 304 I.T.F.'s a,_d175 F.F.'s.
The aircraft generally impacts short of the runway by an average of 4485_
(14,716 feet). There was a great variation in the landing terrain and
obstacles such as light support structure, wooded ground, buildings,
embarkment, dike, trees, marshland and ditch.
The landing category accident characteristics for nineteen scenario candidates
are recorded in "tableB-2 of Appendix B. _he serious structural failures and
related injury consequences are given in Table 5-3.
F
NUMBER OF INJURIES FOR
NUMBER ASSOCIATED ACCIDENTS
STRUCTURE OF SER'IOUS FATAL_'TI'ES
ACCIDENTS INJURIES _(.S ) )
ENGINE 12 253 51 206
SEPARATION
LANDING GEAR 12 156 13 184
SEPARATION
TANK 7 93 S8 182
, RUPTURE
FUSELAGE 9 112 58 I!5
BREAKS
SEAT 7 138 57 45
FAILURESD
m
(REFERENCE TABLE B-2)
TABLE 5-3: LANDING CATEGORY ACCIDENTS, CHARACTERISTICS & INJURY SUMMARIES
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The average airsoee_ equals 135 Kn and the average rate of descent equals 6 m/s
(19.7 fps). In this category, there w_,'e9 fire and 3 explosion accidents.
There were six impacts short of the runway by an average of 549m
(1,800 feet). Seven of the landing category accidents resulted from runway
overruns after the aircraft touchdown on the runway.
The landing category accident produced markedly less impact trauma fatalities
than does the approach category accident. This probably results from the
reduced touchdown speeds of the aircraft at i'mpact.
The rejected takeoff (RTO) category accident characteristics for fourteen
scenario candidates dre recorded in Table B-3 in AppenQix B. The serious
? structural failures and related results are shown in Table 5-4.
- NUMB-EPOF INJURIE-S FOR
NUMBER ASSnCIATED ACCI DENTS
STRUCTURE OF _ _
ACCIDENTS INJURIES IMPAC TR lIMA FIRE
.... (SI) (I.T.F)_ I (F.F.)
ENGINE 5 51 5 51
SEPARATION
LANDINGGEAR 7 140 3 59
SEPARATION
TIRE 6 139 3 48
FAILURE
TANK 8 138 8 49
RUPTURE
FUSELAGE 6 124 8 -_7
3REAKS
,,. ..
SEAT 3 53 7 0
FAILURES
TABLE 5-4: RTO CATEGORY ACCIDENT, CHARACTERISTICS & INJURY SUMMARIES
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The average maximum airspeed achieved during the takeoff run was 145 Kn. Due
to braking procedures, the speeds, however, generally are less than 100 Kn
when the impact occurs.
Nine RTO accidents involved a runway overrun. The average overrun distance
equalled 574m (1,883 feet). The first fire truck arrival took an average of
2.75 minutes and the average fire was extinguished in an average of 8.75
minutes. The RTO category survivable accidents produced noticeably less
numbers of impact trauma and fire fatalities than the approach and landing
accident categories.
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SECTION 6
GENERALIZEDIMPACT SCENARIOS
Generalized Impact Scenarios (GIS) were developed for two accident categories
defined in Section 4 (i.e., Landing and Rejected Takeoff).
These scenarios were developed from actual accident data as reported in NTSB
Blue Books as well as reports of foreign government accident investigation
agencies and the data accumulated in Appendix B from the aforementioned
sources.
These GIS are vital for providing a basis for designing and testing future
safety concept proposals. T_ GIS in thi_ re,)ortwere based on data from past
accidents and may be satisfactory for existing aircraft.
Adjustmerftto these GIS may be required for aircraft designed in the future.
The elements of the Landing and Rejected Takeoff GIS are arranged in a
chronological order. The subject matter of these elements are presented in
Table 6-I. The Landing GIS have six elements whereas the Rejected Takeoff GIS
are composed of three elements.
6-I
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GENERALIZED IMPACT SCENARIOS
FLEMENT CATEGORY
NUMBER [LANDING REJECTED TAKEOFF
METEOROLOGICAL DATA
Y
PERFORMANCE
I AT IMPACT TAKEOFF RUN
PREIMPACT DECELERATION
2 PREPARATION AND OVERRUN
" LOCATION OF STRUCTURAL
3 GROUND IMPACT DAMAGE
STRUCTURAL
4 DAMAGE
5 SLIDE LENGTH
6 SLIDE TIME
t
TABLE 6-I: GENERALIZED IMPACT SCENARIO ELEMENTS
6.1 Generalized Landing Mode Accident Scenario (GLMAS)
The generalized landing mode accident scenario {GLMAS) consists of six
chronologically arranged events that describe the principal scenarlo
elements which influence the survivabilityof the aircraft occupants.
The six scenario elements were derived from the more serlous landing
accidents listed in Table B-2 of Appendix B. This table contains data
for the scenario candidate accidents. These accidentJ are candidates by
virtue of the amount of aircraft damage and injury as well as the
availability of a comp_.ehensiveaccident description.
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METEOROLOGICAL DATA
Average Air Temperature
= 15.6°C (BO°F)
Light Condition: Hours of Light or Darkness
Heavy rain
Wind = 11.5 Kn
6.1.1 PERFORMANCE AT IMPACT
Flaps full down
The aircraft speed will be taken at 10 percent above VSTALL
and should account for aJverse ground winds of about II.5 knots.
The rate of descent and relative ground airspeed were derived
from the data of Table B-2 of Appe,,dixB.
Relative Ground Airspeed, VRGA = 1.14 VSTALL + 11.5 Kn
Vertical Rate of Descent = 6.10 m/s (20 fps)
6.1.2 PREIMPACT PREPARATION
_bis type of accident generally occurs with the crew fully
prepared for a landing. It will he assumed that:
A. The "FASTEN SAFETY BELT" sign is on.
B. The crew has issued last minute landinq and impact
preparation instructions to the passengers.
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6.1.3 LOCATIONOF GROUNDCONTACT
The landing type of accident generally touches down short of the
runway or on the runway. The aircraft that land on the runway
generally touch down several hundred meters beyond the runway
threshold. Then, due to runway conditions or damage suffered at
touchdown, the aircraft overruns the runway and impacts an
embankment, building, or vehicle.
Two ground impact locations will be proposed.
A. Short of the runway onto unprepared ground
(ReferenceTable 6-2)
IMPACT OBSTRUCTION TYPE OF INJURY REF. ACCIDENTS
LANDED I02m (335') SHORT SEVERE S.I. 2-I
CF RWY, HARD LANDING SEVERE F.F.
865m (2838') AIRCRAFT
SLIDE, WRECKAGE SKIDDED
OFF RWY
IMPACTEDTREES i178m (3865') SEVEREF.F. 2-!0
SHORTOF RWY. IMPACTGND
l106m (3629') SHORTOF RWY.
AIRCRAFTSLID ON GNDFOR
164m (539') AIRCRAFT IMPACTS
ON LAVA EMBANKMENT
IABLE 6-2 OFF RUNWAY OBSTRUCTIONS, LANDING MODE ACCIDENTS
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B. On the runway (Reference Table 6-3)
IMPACT OBSTRUCTION TYPE OF INJURY REF. ACCIDENTS
TOUCHDOWN 60m (200') PAST SEVERE S.I. 2-0
RWY THRESHOLD. SEVERE F.F.
SKIDDED OFF RUNWAY.
SLID ON BELLY FOR ABOUT 100m
(300').
IMPACTED VEHICLE & AND
CONCRETE ABUTMENT.
m
; IMPACT TAXIWAY 1219m (4000') SEVERE S.I. 2-13
PAST RWY THRESHOLD.
IMPACT TAIL FIRST.
AIRCRAFI SLID 610m (2000')
AND STOPPED.
TOUCHDOWN 732m (2400') PAST MODERATE S.I. 2-8
RWY THRESHOLD.
OVERRUN RUNWAY FOR 34M (11C')
PLUNGED OVER A 12m (38 foot)
EMBANKMENT
TABLE 6-3: ON RUNWAY, LANDING MODE ACCIDENTS
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6.1.4 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (ReferenceTable 6-4)
L'D'G WING FUEL
ACCID GEAR GEAR ENG WING TANK LINE SEAT FUS
IDEN[ POS'N SEPARATED SEPARATED SEPARATED RUPTURE RUPTURE FAILURE_ BREAKS
,. , ,.
?-I DN BOTH #1 -- REMAINED IN FUS. --
A MAIN INTACT IAT RIGHT
GEARS !MAIN GR.
' I
2-10 DN NOSE ALL 4 -- NO. 4 -- NO J
GEAR MAIN PROBLEM -- I
FOLDED WING
TANK
m
; 2-0 DN BOTH NUMBERS -- LEFT ......
MAIN 2&4 WING
ROOT
r-- ,. , -,.,
B 2-13 UP -- BOTH ON NO NO -- 92 PAX CABIN
INITIAL SEATS INTACT
IMPACT DAMAGED FLOOR
BUCKLED
2-8 -- NOSE & BOTH ........ AFT
BOTH ENGINES & FUS
MAIN PYLONS SEPAR-
ATED
TABLE 6-4: AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, LANDING MODE ACCIDENTS
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6.1.5 SLIDE LENGTH
These slide lengths will be associated with the accidents
described in Item 3 entitled "Location of Ground Impact."
3(A) represents touchdowns short of the runway and
3(B) represents touchdowns on the runway
A. Touchdown Short of the Runway
REFERENCE SLIDE
ACC!DENT LENGTH DESCRIPTION
2-1 865m No obstacle impact
(2838') at end of slide.
2-10 164m Aircraft impacts on a lava
(539') embankment at end of slide.
B. Touchdown On the Runway
REFERENCE SLIDE
ACCIDENT LENGTH DESCRIPTION
2-0 100m Impacted w.hicle and concrete
(300') abutment at end of sliae.
2-13 610m No obstacle impa_L at end
(2000') of slide.
2-8 Overran Plunged over embank_.nt.
Runway
6.1.6 SLIDE TIME
This is the time span, starting from gruund impact, to whe, +
aircraft comes to a stop. The slide time is a function of the
average slide speed and the length of the slide.
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Accidents 2-0 and 2-10:
The a,rcraft slides for a short distance.
The aircraft impacts an obstacle and comes to a halt.
The aircraft has experienced a small speed reduction.
T = Slide Length X 1.944 (Sec.)
VRGA
Accidents 2-I & 2-13:
The aircraft slides on the runway for a long distance. The
aircraft experiences a gradual reduction in speed and comes to a
halt.
T Slide Length X 1.944 (Sec.)
= AVG VRGA -
Accidents 2-8
The aircraft touched down about 800m past the ru,_waythreshold.
The aircraft was unable to slow satisfactorily and overran the
d_parture end of the runway.
The aircraft impacted objects (hill, vehicle, building) outside
the airport perimeter.
T = Slide Length X 1.944 (Sec.)
AVG VRGA
6.2 GENERALIZEDREJECTED TAKEOFF MODE ACCIDENT SCENARIO (GRTMAS)
The generalized rejected takeoff mode accident scenario (GRTMAS)
consists of three chronologically arranged events that describe the
principal scenario elements which influence the survivability of the
aircraft occupants.
The three scenario elements were derived from the more serious takeoff
accidents listed in Table B-3 of Appendix B and the associated data.
These accidents are candidates for development of a generalized takeoff
mode accident scenario.
6-8
1982014353-042
Meteorological Data
Air Temperature = 1.2°C (34.2°F)
Lignt Condition: Hours of Darkness
Rain/Fog: Fog
Ground Wind: 7.2 Kn (average)
Icing: Freezing Drizzle
6.2.1 TAKEOFF RUN
Flap position = 12.5° (Table B-3)
; Max. Airspeed relative to ground = VSTALL+ 15 kn.
= VR
A. Tire Failure (Ref. Accident 3-3)
The main landing gear wheels were locked from the start of the
takeoff roll. Soft, moist, clear ice covered the runway
surface. By 1300m from the start of takeoff, all the left hand
tires are flat.
By 2600m all the right hand tires are flat.
VR is reached by 2800m
The aircraft reaches the end of the runway at 3100m and does not
become airborne.
B. Collision on Runway (Ref. Accident 3-1)
The aircraft reached 145 kn at 1630m (5350') from the takeoff
roll initiation point. The following pilot actions were taken:
power off
Thrust reversers activated
wheel brakes applied
spoiler extended
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Marked • "dcce,eration was felt at 1798m (5900') The runway
length was 2377m (7800').
C. Bird Ingestion (Ref. Acc ant 3-7)
The aircraft reach 100 kn airspeed during takeoff roll.
A flock of birds rose in front of the aircraft. The birds
struck the aircraft. The pilot initiated the following action:
thrust levers moved to idle position
thrust reversal was initiated
heavy braking was applied
6.2.2 DECELERATION AND OVERRUN
A. Long Runway Overrun (Ref. Accident 3-3)
At 206m (675') beyond the runway, the aircraft passed through a
wooden fence.
At 305m (1002') the aircraft contacted the structure supporting
the ILS localizcr facillty.
At 823m (2700'), the aircraft crossed a 3.7m (12') deep ditch.
At 1036m (3400'), the main portion came to a halt.
B. Short Runway Overrun (Ref. Accident 3-1)
The aircraft overran the runway 68.6m (225') to the brow of a
hill.
The aircraft became airborne momentarily.
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The aircraft contacted the ground 20.4m (67') further down the
embankment.
The main gear was sheared off and the nose wheel displaced
rearward.
The aircraft slid and came to rest 128.3m (421') from the end of
the runway.
C. Halted on The Airport (Ref. Accident 3-7)
The aircraft was decelerating
Number 3 engine disintegrated and caught fire.
Several tires and wheels disintegrated.
The aircraft approached the end of the runway at 40kn when it
was steered onto a taxiway.
The right main gear collapsed.
6.2.3 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
A. Long Runway Overrun (Ref. Accident 3-3)
The wreckage came to rest in an upright position.
The fuselage sustained a circumferential fracture aft of the
wing trailing edge.
The main landing gear assemblies were detached from the aircraft.
The main landing gear tires were destroyed by friction milling
during the takoff run.
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The left wing was damaged following impact with the ILS
structure.
The right wing tore loose at the ditch and a large quantity of
fuel was released.
B. Short Runway Overrun (Ref. Accident 3-3)
The main landing gear was sheared.
The nose wheel was displaced rearward and forced the cabin floor
upward .38m (15").
The fuselage upper structure was ruptured forward of the wing.
The right wing f_iled inboard of the No, 4 engine.
Engines Numbers 1 & 2 were partially separated from the wing.
C. Halted on the Airport (Ref. Accident 3-7)
The right main landing gear collapsed.
The left and center main 9ears had separated.
The right wing fuel tanks were ruptured first in the No. 3 fuel
tank at about 7.62m (25') outboard of No. 3 engine. This was
followed by penetration of the lower skin of the No. 2 fuel tank
by parts of the No. 3 engine.
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iSECTION 7
ASSESSMENT OF ADVANCED MATERIALS
The demand for reduced life cycles costs for aircraft has created tremendous
pressur'esto use light or more efficient materials and adopt new manufacturing
processes. Ideally, these new materials and processes should not cause any
added concern about the impact tolerance of the aircraft.
7.1 Survey of Advanced Materials and Processes
The new materials to be considered can be grouped into three categories:
1. Aluminum Alloys
2. Metal Matrix Materials
3. Advanced Composites
Th_ use of new fabrication techniques may significantly affect the impact
tolerance of the aircraft. New processes to be considered are:
I. Bonding
2. Diffusion Bonded/SuperplasticFormed (DB/SPF) Titanium
3. Large Castings
4. Filament Winding
5. Trapped Rubber
7.2 Aluminum Alloys
There are several new aluminum alloys under active consideration. There
should be no significant difference in impact tolerance for any of
these. Aluminum alloys under consideration include the following:
I. 2224-T351
2. 2324-T391
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3. 7010-T76
4. 7049-T76, T73
5. 7150-T6
6. 7175-T736
7. 7475-T6, T76, T73
8. CT90-T6, T7
9. CT91-T6, T7
10. AI-Li
'7.3 Metal Matrix Materials
Two metal matrix materials have emerged _s candidates for structural
; applications. These are Boron Carbide/Aluminum and Silicone Carbide
coated Boron/Aluminum. Both of these materials may be superior to
aluminum in a crash scenario. However, no test data under impact
conditions exists. In any event, these materials will likely find
application only in elevated temperature applications due to their high
cost.
7.4 Advanced Composites
Advanced composite structure (primarily graphite/epoxy) is both the most
promising new material application and the most controversial. Limited
data are available.
Even though advanced composite laminates will burn, they do not melt
appreciably. The burning of the graphite/epoxy composite would result in
pyrolysis of the resin; the graphite fibers would survive but matrix
cohesion and structural int,_rity would be degraded.
The use of graphite composites in commercial aircraft presents new
considerations particularly with regard to i_pact tolerance. Designs and
material modifications are now appearing to improve the durability and
toughness of the composite structure. It wiil be of immense interest to
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determine whether these improvement for relatively low energy impact Kill
also show as improvement in the high energy impacts and crack propagation
associated with a typical impact scenario. At best, however, it is
difficult to envision a graphite (or Kevlar) reinforced organic matrix
equivalent to the metal structure.
It is probable that the use of advanced composites i.lcommercial aircraft
may be avoided in some critical locations such as forward fuselage, main
landing gear, etc. where high energy impact might jeopardize passenger
safety.
Advanced composite materials are now being used in structural
,, applications on a routine basis in military aircraft and will soon be
applied in many areas on large commercial transports. Graphite/epoxy is
the current leading material to offer i,jhtweight, strong, rigid
structure and, at the same time, offer the potential for low cost
fabrication.
7.5 New Processes
Several new processes have shown promise for reducing the cost of
manufacture. Some of these will affect the crashworthiness of the end
item and some will not.
I. Bonding - Bonded structure can provide significant crack stopping
_nich should be available at all impact energy levels.
2. Diffusion Bonded/Superplastic Formed Titanium - Superplastic
Formed/Diffusion Bonded titanium sandwich is very stable under
compression loading and exi.ibits exceptional resistance to damage
from high impact forces. The construction possesses good general
stability due to the ability to redistribute loads and dissipate
energy. SPF/DB sandwich tends to crush rather than tear apart,
absorbs energy, and sustains high crushing loads. These attributes
provide increased impact tolerance when compared to conventicnal
skin-stringer construction normally used in forward fuselage
applications.
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3. Large Castings - Large castings demonstrate efficiency by replacing
built up sheet structure. The latter have greater energy absorbing
capability. Consequently, the use of large castings may detract from
impact tolerance.
4. Filament Winding - This technique produces composite parts at lower
resin content than with autoclave curing. However, no tests have
been found to date that would define either the resistance of a
filament wound part to high energy impact or the effect of resin
content.
5. Trapped Rubber - This process also tends to produce parts with lower
resin content but insufficient data is available to define impact
resistancewith reduced resin content.
7.6 Test Recommendations for Advanced Composites
All current and probable future matrix resins generally exhibit a low
strain-to-failurecharacteristic behavior compared to metals. Extensive
impact tolerance studies for metal aircraft structures have been
conducted (Ref. 22, 23 and 24) but an investiqation of the impact
characteristics of composite airframe structures is needed and due to the
common strain-to-failure characteristic will be generally applicable to
whichever polymer matrix is used in the future.
The objectives of this impact investigationare the following:
I. Survey the literature to determine the existing data base on crash
impact behavior of composites.
2. Review current analyticcl methods used for the design of impact
toleranct airframe structures and assess their suitability for
analysis of composite structure.
3. Develop the concept/problemsthat should be considered.
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4. Outline the test needed to develop a design data base.
5. Consider the trade-off factors between concept selection, compatible
manufacturingmethods and various cost factors.
Analytical impact prediction methods should include structural
evaluatio,,,material characterization, and failure analysis. The impact
environment needs to be defined from the literature in terms of expected
strain rates, and the time sequence of events. Characterization of
materials should be in terms of the energy absorption capabilities of
lam,nates and cores.
This characterization should include the post-bucking behavior of the
laminated composite structures. Failure analysis r,e_dsto include the
complex failure modes of laminated structures for impact loading.
In addition, the analysis should he concerned with the structural aspects
of flammability and the hazards associated with the thermal decomposition
of polymeric composites during a post-impact fire. In particular, the
noxious gas and smoke evolution during the polymer thermal decomposition
should be related to human toleranco levels. Another issue affecting the
response of a composite _;aterialstructure in an impact environment is
that of service life degradation prior to the impact.
Concepts for evaluation should include as a minimum:
1. Maintain a protective shell around the occupied area.
2. Provide for post-impact emergency egress.
3. Provide energy absorbing structure to reduce impact loads on the
occupants.
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4. Provide attachment structure to retain large loads and seats.
5. Eliminate strike hazards within the cabin.
6. Provide breakaway structure to prevent follow-on damage from engines
or landing gear.
7. New "crack stopper" or other constructions and new resin matrix
systems _o minimize brittle failure modes.
There is almost a complete lack of data on the high energy impact
resistance of advanced materials. It is becoming a matter of some
urgency that such data be developed for advanced composites as well as
: other advanced materials.
Initial data could first be obtained by analytical means from basic
material properties applied to structural design concepts. Subcomponent
specimens incorporating these design concepts should then be fabricated
and subjected to appropriate tests to provide a means of comparlng rival
concepts, to provide a means of confirming predictions and to accumulate
semi-scale impact test data.
Candidate materials for these semi-scale impact t_ts are
I. Aluminum for the program baseline
2. Graphite/Epoxy Composites
Rigidite 5208/T300 for the composite baseline
CIBA #4/T300 (Reference NASA Rept. 165677)
BP907/T300 (ReferenceNASA Rept. 165677)
3, Thermoplastic Resin
PEEK resin with T300 graphite Fiber
A new resin from a new NASA program
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4. Two polylmide/graphltesystems to be selected
5. Kevlar/Epoxy
6. Boron Aluminum
7. Graphite Aluminum
8. Large Aluminum Castings
The large favorable material/subcomponent specimens should demonstrate
the following properties:
I. The ability to dissipate large amou_ts of impact energy (i.e. exhibit
a large area under the force/deflectiondiagram).
2. Exhibit resistance to abrasion damage during sliding motion when the
material is in contact with surfaces of concrete, asphalt and
unprepared ground variatio,s of temperature and moisture conditions
which may be significant.
3. Exhibit low tendencies to produce heat and electric sparks while
sliding in contact with concrete, asphalt and unprepared ground.
There are at least four types of tests needed to demonstrate the
adaptability of a material for impact applications. These tests are
designed to simulate some element of an actual accident. The proposed
test tyres are:
I. Head on Impact
The test is designed to represent a possible head on impact against a
wall or building.
The test speci,nenwould be in the form of a cyclinder to represent
three bays of a scaled down forward s_ction of a fuselage. The
specimens of the various materials must be of comparable strengths.
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The specimen would be subjected to an axial load sufficient to cause
buckling. The load would be gradually increased to promote continued
buckling and collapse. Observations of force versus deflection and
modes of failure would be made and recorded. The force/deflection
data for all specimens would be normalized to ultimate strength to
permit an equi*able impact tolerance comparison to be made.
2. Vertical Drop
The vdrpose of this test is to demonstrate the energy absorption
capability of a material system for the possible high rate of descent
experienced in some accidents.
The portion of the fuselage structure that provides the cushioning
for the excessive rate of descent situation is primarily below the
flocr. Thus, the test specimen would have the form of three bays of
fuselage bounded above by the top of the fuselage and below by the
fuselage lower outer skim.
The specimen would be suhjected to loads applied perpendicular to t_,e
plane of the floor. The load would he qradually increased to promote
buckling and then increased to cause continued buckling and
progressive collapse.
The data to be recorded and the method of using the data is the same
as for Test No. I.
3. Abrasion
During an accident sequence, a fuselage underbelly may be suhiected
to abrasion. It is important that fuselage damaqe be kept to a
minimum. Thus, a knowledge of the materia3 resistance to abrasion is
necessary.
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An initial evaluation of the candidate materials could be
accomplished with flat plate specimens acted upon by a rotating ring
of abrasive material (concrete, asphalt or sand). The speed of the
disc, the mean distance of travel and the applied pressure would be
made to correspond to a typical impact scenario. The depth of the
abraded groove would reveal the desired material evaluation.
4. Sparking
J
An accident sequence may result in t_e aircraft sliding on its
belly. This can lead to sparking as the wreckage passes over a
concrete, asphalt or rocky surface which in turn may serve as an
igrition source for spilled fuel. Materials which avoid this
behavior are desirable.
A setup and test procedure similar to the "Abrasion Test" (Test
No. 3) but with ,modificationscould serve the purpose required here.
The modifications consist of:
a) Placing a container of fuel and spraying some fuel mist in the
area where the sparks are expected.
b) Arranging the typical meteorological conditions, as described in
the generalized impact scenarios cf Section 6, for the test
environment.
Failure to pass this test may not rule out a composite material,
since the addition of a modest amount of a benign material such as
Dacron or Kevlar fiber could improve the properties of the basi
material.
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SECTION 8
EVALUATION OF THE
"AIRCRAFTCRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE"
In a project begun in 1965 and continuing to the present, periodically updated
versions of the Crash Survival Design Guide have been published, the latest
being USARTL-TR-79-22Athrough 22E These reports have as their objective the
presentationof the current state of the art in impact survival design for use
bj aircraft design engineers. The Design Guide information has influenced the
establishment of certain Military Standards dealing with aircraft impact
; tolerance (MIL-STD-1290AV).
As an Army project, the Design Guide naturally concentrates on helicopters and
light fixed-wing aircraft, but tiledesign considerations co_ered are applicable
in some degree to large transport aircraft as well.
Differences in the basis misslons cf combat versus civilian-transport aircraft
serve to distinguish impact environments and structural design ranges. The
combat aircraft is stronger and more manueverable. The civilian transport is
optimized for a very specific mission from which l'ttle deviation is expected
ard is designed with a high sersitivity to payload/s_ructure weight ratio at.i
to furl consumption. Because the design strength oF the civilian transport is
lower, it would experience more structural damage than the military airplane
in a crash at the same velocity. This is not to say, however, that occupant
survivabilitywould be lower in the transport.
The large transport fuselage is also a different type of structure, a
semimonocoque shell nf low strength but high strength-to-weight ratio, and
with few areas of such concentrated strength as a frame structure would
display.
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Nevertheless, the Design Guide provides useful information for the transport
designer in understanding the general nature of tne impact phenomenon, in
providing analysis and testing methods, and in setting out concepts and
devices for improvement of impact tolerance of components.
The bulk of the evaluation for Volumes II and V inclusive is located in
Appendix E. The evaluation concerns itself primarily with structural subjects
such as design criteria, design methods, design data and energy absorbing
concepts. Comments on data about human tolerance to aircraft impact which is
contained in Volume Ill (Reference 3) is included in Section 9.
8.i Conclusions
The Army Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide is unique as a general aid
to structural design for impact tolerance. It is clear that overwhelming
emphasis is given to helicopters, although light, fixed-wing aircraft are
also covered.
The main value of the Guide to the transport category airplane designer
is in the illustration of methodology, and an important contribution is
the definition of impact conditions in terms of idealized but specific
acceleration vs time pulses. There is no justification at this time for
the adoption of the quantitative properties of these pulses for civilian
transports but it is essential that values for large transport impact
eventually be established before rational structural design requirements
can be evolved.
The degree of detail in treatments of various aspects of the structural
design problems is somewhat uneven, with Volume IV being notable for
comprehensiveness and sophistication in its treatment of design
considerationsfor impact tolerant seats.
The questions of dynamic vs static requirements in design analysis and
testing appear to be unsettled, but the development of static strength
requirements in terms of bounds on load-deformationcurves, based on
8-2
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extensive dynamic response studies, is a feasible approach. The
guide is also a han source for particular design concepts and
devices, particularly for energy absorbing "stroking" devices and for
certain material properties.
Review of the Design Guide suggests that much could be gained from a
project where the objective would be to set out a side-by-side
comparison of the current requirements for civilian and military
aircraft and in light of this to review the basis for differences,
and to suggest testing and other research programs which might update
the current requirements.
; It is clear that a commercial transport equivalent to the U.S. Army
Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide would do much to centralize the
location of the large quantities of data now in existence and expand
its use in aircraft design practice.
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SECTION q
HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT
Many indices have been proposed for the purpose of giving some measure of the
liklihood of occupant injury during an impact sequence. Several of the more
prominent indices are discussed in Appendix F.
These indices include the Dynamic Response Index (DRI) and other spinal injury
models, the Gadd Severity Index and the related Head Injury Criterion (HIC) of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208. A brief discussion is given of leg
injury criteria, of indices for "off axis" accelerations, of the shock
spectrum approach, and of flailing-distanceand volume-reduction indices.
9.1 Conclusions
A number of injury criteria, both local and whole-body, have been
proposed, although the experimental data base from which they have been
drawn is extensive, there does not appear to he any comprehensive set of
criteria which a design engineer could use with confidence in transport
aircraft impact tolerance application. Criteria applicable to Air Force
ejection seat design should not be carried over to the transport
passenger who exhibits a wide range in age, size, weight, physical
condition and degree of restraint. A careful study which results in a
definitive set of injury criteria for transport impact application,
would, although expensive, be an important contribution to the state of
the art, without which a real evaluation of impact tolerance would be
impossible.
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SECTION 10
MERIT FUNCTIONS
The merit of a concept is a function of parameters that are intimate with the
design objective of the concept. For each design or conceptual alternative,
these parameters take on a specific set of magnitudes. These parameters can
be combined into a single number whic_ expresses the merit of the design. The
best design among competing alternatives produces the largest merit value.
The parameters fall into three categories: cost, effectiveness, and societal
concern.
; The cost element can be represented in one of two ways: acquisition cost, or
direct operating cost. From the viewpoint of airline management, direct
operating cost is th_ most desirable measure, since it includes the
acquisition cost of each incremental change to the airplane. From the
manufacturer's point of view he must know, with some precision, the magnitude
of costs involved with proposed modifications. In any event, a baseline must
be identified and its cost established so as to derive the effect of
incre_nentalchanges.
Directing operating costs are derived by use of the Douglas Advanced
Engineering Method, which represents a continuum of updating of the 1967 ATA
Method. The major modifications made for updating include 1980 price levels,
current operating practices, profiles and performance, and system attributes.
The basic constituents of the direct operating cost (DOC) of aircraft are
flight crew, cabin crew, airframe depreciation, engine depreciation,
insurance, landing fees, airframe maintenance, engine maintenance, and fuel
costs. A typical DOC schedule represents a single airplane with a
representativetype of operation.
Acquisitien costs include the price of the aircraft, with estimates of proposed
candidates for changes derived on a discrete basis. This means that proposed
modificationsto the baseline, such as changes in structures configurations,
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have been reviewed as separate issues for each configuration. The development
program, which includes also the type certification, has been summarized over
a given quantity designated as a breakeven point. Cost elements used to
derive a price are shown below:
o Design Engineering o Sustaining Engineering
o Fabrication o Sustaining Tooling
o Assembly o Manufacturing Development
o Inspection o Planning
o Tooling o Flight Test
o Raw Materials and Purchased Parts o Laboratories
o Instrumentsand Special Equipment o Propulsion
; o Product Support o Miscellaneous
The nature of the study dictates very clearly that case examples have to be
structured hypothetically, since quantities of airplanes must be assumed for
amortization purposes and breakeven determinations. Other factors include use
of new or existing aircraft, class of airplane, etc.
It is premature at this point to suggest structural safety concepts because a
reliable analytical method is unavailable to perform dependable merit function
studies. The evaluation of advanced composites through impact analysis and
test described in Section 7 and the experience and data cained in the
recommended analysis and component test effort of Sections 11 and 12 should
help reveal structuralconcepts capable of improving passenger survivability.
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SECTION 11.0
ANALYTICAL METHODS
It is contemplated in the future that analysis methods will be used in
ascertaining the dynamic behavior of an aircraft under impact conditions. Two
accomplishments are necessary for this to occur: (I) accepted impact
scenarios and (2) adequate analytic prediction procedures. This latteri
category is of concern in this section.
11.1 Analytical Requirements
Impact dynamic analysis methods for large transport aircraft are
envisioned as a set of programs of differing complexity which serve a
variety of purposes. These include (I) performing preliminary designs,
(2) improving impact tolerant designs, (3) simulating accidents, (4)
aiding in establishing impact criteria, (5) analyzing final designs, (6)
providing properties for simpler programs and (7) verifying suitability
of simpler procedures.
The intended purpose essentially dictates the requirements of the impact
analysis method. For performing preliminary designs and parameter
studies for impact tolerance improvements, it would be desirable to use a
reasonably simplistic program which is relatively fast and inexpensive to
run. Its accuracy need not be so stringent as to require a detailed
reproduction of the actual response history, but it should give, for
instance, a reasonable estimate of the peak accelerations to which an
occupant is exposed. As an example, this type of program could begin
with a defined set of acceleration impulses at the base of an occupant's
seat.
Representative impulses for the indicated simple method can come from
test data and/or analytical simulations of the complete aircraft using a
more compley program, most likely of the hybrid type. This form of
program incorporates a coars_ model of the aircraft structure, preferably
containing less than 300 degrees-of-freedom. The impulses to
11-1
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be defined by this program are of sufficiently short duration to permit
CPU times of the order of 10000 times real time. The hybrid program
should also indicate the potential for wing fuel tank rupture, fuselage
rupture, penetration of large masses into the fuselage and excessive
volume change of the occupant's cabin. The hybrid program must be able
to simulate both landing and ground run impact scenarios with starting
routines appropriate to these conditions. Subsequent to the start, it
should be able to handle nonlinear effects produced from large
deflections and material inelasticity and permit the airplane to
adequately interact with hard and soft surfaces of varying profile.
Within the hybrid category, but of simpler form, could be included a
full airplane program which consists of flexible modes and nonlinear
elements for the under part of the fuselage and landing gears. This
program would be used for less severe impacts dominated by vertical
impact. A program classified as simple, should contain le;s than 50
degrees of freedom for the structurai model, but may be merged with
simplified forms of occupant models. The execution CPU time shob be
less than 1000 times real time.
In order to operate the hybrid and simpler type programs, the nonlinear
properties for any highly loaded structural element must be developed
from test or an advanced analysis procedure of the finite element type.
In order to serve this purpose, the finite element procedure must be
able to handle large deflections and inelastic material behavior. It
also should have the capacity to work with structural models containing
in the order of 1000 degrees of freedom. A finite element program can
be used to determine whether significant differences exist between
static dF,d dynamic properties. The CPU time for establishing dynamic
properties can be as much as 100,000 times real time due to the short
duration of real time simulation needed for this purpose.
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q_1.2 Review of Existing Analysis Programs
Computer programs concerned with impact dynamic responses presently
exist which have extensive histories of development. Three of these
programs were given a limited review in the course of the study effort;
namely, KRASH, DYCAST and SOMLA. The total airplane impact dynamics
simulation program KRASH is well documented both technically and for
usage (see References 13 and 14). The occupant-seat dynamic impact
program SOMLA is similarly well documented (see References 11 and 12).
The attributes of th_ finite element impact dynamics program _YCAST were
mainly discerned from published papers (see, for example, Reference
I0).
: None of the above computer programs were run in the course of the
review. Because of this, no comment can be made concerning the ability
of these programs to predict with reasonable accuracy the impact dynamic
responses of large transports, llowever,the literature (e.g., Reference
10) indicates that the KRASH and DYCAST programs can provide
satisfactory response predictions for less complex airframe
configurations and simple impact scenarios. Reasonable correlation has
also been achieved between controlled experimental results and %OMLA
program predictions when simple seat configurations are used.
(Reference9)
Since no work was done with these impact scenario computer programs,
only subjective remarks can be made concerning the implementation of the
considered programs. Adequate user documentation is a necessity for
implementation. Both the KRASH and SOMLA programs are presently
satisfactory in this re:_pect(see previously cited references). SOMLA'
limited scope along with its standardized occupant and seat models makL
the set-up of the program relatively easy. The KRASH program utilizes a
simplified airframe model composed of an open grid of beams. Although
providing a documented explanation of the way to set the properties for
the model's elements, the beginning user would have great difficulty in
first defining the model for a large transport and then establishing the
numerical properties of its elements. Extensive trials with the program
by a devoted operator would be needed _e surmount this difficulty.
11-3
N
1982014353-064
Defining the model for the structure of a large transport is the most
difficult step in implementing a finite element computer program such as
DYCAST. The size and complexity of the large transport structure
imposes considerable limitations on the modeling detail that can be
used. Due to its involved nature, it does not appear that a finite
element approach can be used for a complete large transport aircraft.
Instead, the finite element procedures will most likely be limited to
localized portions of the structure either for establishing properties
or refining results obtained from more gross analyses.
Of the reviewed programs, only KRASH is potentially suitable for large
transport airplane impact scenario simulations. The technical approach
to the KRASH program satisfies man_ of the requirements mentioned in the
previous section. Its limitations in dynamic degrees of freedom seems
too restrictive for large transports. The running time of the program
is satisfactory for scenarios in which the primary responses occur
within 0.2 seconds after initiation of the impact sequence. The most
difficult matter to discern is the modeling detail needed for 3arge
transport fuselages. There is no clear methodology for laying out the
beam grid for the fuselage and then setting the properties for the
beams. Given the grid, it appears that the properties of the beams are
primarily set to approximate the stiffness characteristics of the
original structure. It is not evident whether these same properties are
satisfactory for obtaining an adequate internal stress state for failure
determination. Large displacements are handled well in KRASH through
the Eulerian formulation. The manner of accounting for inelastic
effects by means of the KR factors appears to be reasonable and fits
well into the hybrid concep_ of the KRASH program. Obtaining the data
for these factors, however, may be a formidable task.
In KRASH, the impact sequence can only begin with the airplane in a
landing attitude at touchdown. This should be generalized to permit the
airplane to also assume a takeoff attitude at the start. The
evolutionary nature of the impact responses precludes the consideration
of arbitrary starting points during the impact sequence. The airplane
during an impact sequence can be in contact with either hard or yielding
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surfaces. KRASH contains a simple soil yielding model which in many
respects fits well into the concept of the total program. It isn't
apparent, however, that the plowing force should be prescribed
independently of the yielding. The terrain over which the airplane
operates in the KRASH program is defined by a linear varying or ramp
type profile. Arbitrary profiles representing features as ditches or
embankments are not covered. This situation should be relatively easy
to remedy in the program.
In contrast to the corresponding weakness in KRASH, the strong point of
the DYCAST program is the ability to follow the structure's internal
stress behavior in sufficient detail for the assessment of the failure
potential of the structure. In this regard, the seat finite element
formulations in SOMLA needs improvement. Apart from this aspect, SOMLA
handles the combination occupant-seat analysis quite well providing
detailed graphics of the occupant's motions during the simulated impact
condition. It would be desirable to extend SOMLA's analysis capability
to cover coupled multi-occupant,multi-seat responses.
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11.3 Analysis Recommendations
Experience with the predictive accuracy of analytical programs is most
preferably gained by making comparisons of calculated results with those
from controlled experiments. The latter, howev_', are sparse for
helicopters and general aviation airplanes and ezsentially nonexistent
for large transports. If the more elaborate impact dynamic programs
such as DYCAST and KRASH can predict responses reasonably well for the
former categories of air vehicles, then the predictions from these
programs for large transports must serve as a refe,ence until suitable
experimental information can be obtained.
It is importa,;tthat development continue on these advanced programs,
particularly in the area of large transport structure modeling. The
predictive performance_ c_ould be further checked by comparisons between
each other on actual transport designs, as well as on contrived
structural models. Checking should also be made against experimental
data obtained from relatively inexpensive impact tests of structural
components. Modeling approaches for seats and occupants should be
included in the structural modeling investigations. For organizations
which may use the advanced programs but have not been participants in
their development, workshops should be set-up to gain familiarity with
these programs.
A significant effort should be devoted to the formulation of simplified
analysis approaches which serve preliminary design and parametric
variation study purposes. One concept to consider is the application of
shaped acceleration pulses at the base of the occupant's seat. For this
approach the primary activity would be in establishing the properties of
a set of pulses. A second concept could involve modeling most of the
airplane by means of flexible mode shapes. This model would use
nonlinear elements below the fuselage floor and would be able to account
for mild impacts. For preliminary structural d_sign, it should be
explored whether the results of this last model -ould be empirically
scaled to higher impact conditions. Irrespective of the concept, the
advanced analysis programs would be used to generate the data necessary
for the development and verification of the simpler programs.
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SECTION 12
TEST METHODS
An adequate test program is vital to assist in the search for and the
developing of safety improvements.
"restingfor impact tolerance improvement, from the point of view of structural
response oF a transport category airplane in an impact situation should be
directed to achieving one or more of the following six objectives.
o Determining Survivability Boundaries
This is the empirical determination of the parameter ranges within which
an impact is survivable.
o Characterizin,_In,_;;cConditions
The determination of external forces on the airplane to be expected at
various impact speeds, angl_, gross weights, terrain types, etc.
o IdentifyingStructural Failure Modes
It is of extreme importance to know the manner in which structural
subsystems will fail during the impact: plastic deformation, fracture,
buckling, etc.; including the sequence of failures.
o Determining Structural Properties
Besides known material properties lelastic mod,llus, stress-strain
diagrams, etc.) it is of interest to have the ability to model a complt,x
structure by a simple one such as a spring. Force-deflecti_l
characteristics of the complex structure are needed under static and
dynamic conditions.
12-I
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o Evaluating Design Criteria
Dynamic tests of full scale systems and subsystems are needed in order to
judge whether current static design criteria are reasonable and adequate.
o Suggesting Design Improvements
Critical failure modes become apparent in a sequence of carefully
observed tests. Then the designer can direct his attention to specific
modes.
There are five types of tests reviewed in this sect_en. Of these, which
include total airplane, scale models, terrain, structural subsystems and
simple structures, structural subsystems testing is the experimental approach
which will provide the most useful information for enhanclng impact tolerance.
Distinct areas such as landing gear, fuselage and seats should be hlg _ghted.
Considerable analysis and test planning will be necessary to ensure that te:ts
will be run at maximum effectiveness. Static testing alone w,_uld be of
limited value, and the parallel performance of static and dynanHc tests of
equivalent specimens would improve our understanding of dynamic failure modes
and would enhance the capability of analytical prediction methods.
12.1 Review of Past Test Programs
A review of reports listed as References 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and Z]
was carried out. References 15 and 16 report on the impact tests
performed with full scale propeller transport alrcr_ft that bear a close
representation to the majority of the aircraft types being studied here. 4
The material of References 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 are of less direct
interest since they apply to general aviation aircraft and scale testing.
Impact tests of full-scale aircraft have been performed in three areas.
Helicopters have been drop tested to determine undercarriage impact
response and crew G-loading. NASA has performed a large number of
12-?
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pendulum swing drops with single and twin engined light airplanes. The
only full scale impact tests of large transport aircraft were sponsored
by the FAA and reported in 1965. There were two airplanes tested: a
Douglas DC-7 (Ref, ]5) and a Lockheed Constellation model 1649 (Ref. 16).
Each test was run on the ground. The aircraft was guided into a series
of barriers with a monorail nose landing gear guidance system. Instrumen-
tation consisted of accelerometers, anthropomorphic dummies and motion
picture cameras. The principal achievements of the tests were thei
verification ef a method of producing d realistic impact environment and
the production of useful records of acceleration vs time at various
points on the aircraft and of records of subsystem failure modes. A
number of restraint system experiments showed that occupant restraint
; systems enhance safety.
A review of the highlights of the impact test of a Douglas DC-7 aircraft
(reported in Reference 16) is presented in Appendix C.
12.2 Recommendationsfor Future Tests
All of the conceivable testir_g in this area will be of one of the
followingtypes:
o total airpl(,ne
o scale model
o terrain
o structural subsystems
o simple structures
Each of these types of tests has its own set of implications for cost,
achievable objectives, aridmethodology.
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12.2.1 Total Airplane Testing
For our purposes, the DC-7 and Constellation tests methodology
could be utilized and updated with modern equipn,_nt,particularly
in the application of telemetry techniques. Muc_ _f what would
be learned, however, would be of a merely qualitative nature, and
it is not clear that such information is not already available in
the earlier reports and in actual data records. Structural
dynamic information generated in such a test would be most usefu_
for characterizing impact conditions, e.g., in learning of the
duration and character of the accelerations experienced; and in
substructural testing, e.g., correlating occupant/seat accelera-
; tions with floor accelerations. Some correlation of fuselage
crushing with floor loading would be attempted, but the proba-
bility of success of such an experiment is doubtful because of
the high degree of uncertainty inherent in measuring deformations.
In light cf the expenses which would be involved in such a test
it is unlikely that conducting one for structural dynamic testing
purposes alone would be cost-effective.
12.2.2 Scale Model Testing
The utility of scale models in impact testing is small because of
the uncertainty in scaling laws for structures undergoing gross
deformation under impact conditions. This uncertainty exists
because the physics of dynamic failure of materials is not well
understcod. Also a realistic model of a monocoque airplane
structure would require such extreme detail in representation
that the model would probably be more expensive than the full
scale version. Accordingly, scale model testing generally should
not be considered unless full scale tests are absolutely ruled
out by lack of test facilities. This, however, does not seem to
be the case.
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12.2.3 Terrain Testing
An airplane impact involves deformation of both structure and
ground, often with a noticeable plowing effect. Modeling the
ground response by a spring and by a sliding friction coefficient
appear to be necessary where analysis techniques of simulation
are used, as in the Lockheed KRASH computer program.
Determination of ground friction can be achieved through drag
tests using a weighted riqid model. Experiments of the plowing
effect cannot be devised without first developing scaling laws,
probably based on momentum and fluid mechanics models.
12.?.4 Structural Subsystems
Static and dynamic testing of aircraft structura] subsystems
provides the greatest promise for improving impact tolerance.
The following are the most promising substructures:
landing gears
seats
fuselage sections
With landing gears the important questions involve breakaway
loads and post-breakaway penetration of fuselage or wing,
particularly with regard to fuel tank rupture. It is probable
that landing gear design for breakaway will enhance overall
survivability in a accident; that is, landing gears should not be
as strong as possible: and high impact loads are probably better
distributed over the fuselage underbelly.
Another factor to be considered is that the reliability of
computer program analys_s methods are still unproved as well as
lengthy and expensive Thus, for the purpose of providing a
basis for developing a simplified method of analysis (as
suggested in Sections 11.1 and 11.3) along with
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improved accuracy, a test program has been outlined below and in
Appendix D which is capable of providing basic impact data such as
I) Component load versus deflection measurements. (Acquiring
load data for these tests may require a calibrated platform
to receive the impact of the specimen in motion.)
2) Component failure modes (fuselage, wing, landing gear).
_) Structural member failure modes (stringer, ribs, frames).
4) Accelerometer load pulse plots.
The test program consists of three basic types of tests.
I) Landing gear and wing structure
o Static test
o Drop test onto unprepared ground
o Drop test onto a cement runway
2) Fuselage underbelly
o Static test
o Drop test on underbelly on unprepared ground
o Drop test on underbelly on concrete runway
o Fuselage break drop test
o Fuselage slide on unprepared ground
o Fuselage slide of a concrete runway
o Fuselage head on impact against a large tree or building.
3) Seat and support structur:
o Static test
o Drop test
o Mounted on sled in motion
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qAircraft component tests were preferred due to the excessive
expense of full scale complete aircraft tests. In order to
obtain an indication of the range of desired data, aircraft
components for test should be obtained from small, medium and
large aircraft from salvage sources. Obviously, initial testing
would be done with components fabricated from state of the art
metal materials and methods. Future tests involving composite
aircraft components would probably require components especially
' fabricated for this purpose due to unavailability of salvage
specimens.
The initial tests would serve as data gathering exercises,
; whereas later tests could serve as analysis verification efforts
as well.
The basic purpose for this program is to improve passenger
survivability. These tests may also serve to reveal the need and
provide methods to accomplish design improvements.
The conditions for these tests will be derived from the
recommended critical generalized impact scenarios in Section 6.
12.2.4.1 Landing gear impact tests of the following types may be performed.
(A) Weighted wing section with
gear impact against a bumper.
Record possible penetration of wing.
Measured loads at gear breakaway.
The tests should be performed
w_IGHT
dynarically (at typical landing |
and slow-flight speeds) and
Ivoryw l
Impact at various angles. &e_RC_)_....,.,_
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(B) Weighted fuselage section with _, _
gear impact against a bumper. _rnvrrr
Record load-deflectionhistory.
Evaluate penetration of fuselage.
¢
Determine test strength of damaged fuselage.
(C) Drop test onto an incline plane
(ReferenceAppendix D, Test 1.1.0, Figure D-I)
12.2.4.2 Fuselage drop tests will provide information about the modes
of crushing of underbelly structure, and the force-deflection
characteristics in the collapse. Static tests provide force-
deflection chartacteristics. Probably a section containing a
minimum of three bays will be needed in order to account for
longitudinal buckling. (Reference Appendix D, Test 1.2.0,
Figuce D-2)
Fuselage drop tests will provide accelerations vs time at
various flour points, at seats and at anthropomorphic
dummies. (ReFerer.ceAppendix D, Test 1.2.0, Figure D-3)
Shearing of the fuselage is a critical failure mode affecting
s,,rvivability. Drop tests will determine the net impulse
required to bring about a fuselage break. (Reference
Appendix D, Te_t 1.2.0, Figure D-4)
12-8
1982014353-075
12.2.4.3 Seat testing should be performed both statically and
dynemica_y. Results will permit evaluation of current
static load design criteria and determine occupant G
loading at the point of seat failure. Seat tests
should cover longitudinal, lateral and vertical
accelerations. Sled tests, or, if feasible, drop tests
wo_Id be performed. Multiple seat specimens should be
used, as the strength and failure modes of multiple
s_at packages may differ considerably from those for
single seats. (ReferenceAppendix D, Test 1.3.0)
Comparison with existing analytical techniques, such as
; the SOMLA code with seat capability,would be made.
12.2.5 Simple structural tests (i.e. tests on subcomponents such as
beams or columns) are not recommended since they do not
provide useful information on the impact behavior of
airplanes and do not suffice to validate a computer program.
In the latter case, even if accurate predictions were
obtained there would be no assurance that the applied
hlethodology would perform satisfactorily for more complex
conditions.
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APPENDIX A
ACCIDENT DATA BASE
This appendix summarizes the entire accident data base used in this study.
The aircraft of the data base accidents are principally domestic aircrafti
certified to FAR Part 25 in the service of domestic and foreign airlines. The
data base consists only of accidents judged to be impact survivable (i.e., in
which all occupants did r_t receive fatal injuries as a result of impact
forces imposed during the impact sequence). Table 4-1 gives an indication of
.- the degree of documentation avallab]e with each accident record.
The accident data is presented in three tables according to the flight mode of
the aircraft prior to the crash. These tables are:
Table A-l: Approach Accidents
Table A-2: Landing Accidents
Table A-3: Rejected Takeoff Accidents
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APPENDIX B
SCENARIO CANDIDATES ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS
This appendix contains l'_stingsof accident data from the well documented
accidents which are listed in Fable 4-1. The data is presented in three
tables:
Table B-I: Approach #.ccidents- Characteristicsand As_oclated Injuries
Table B-2: Landing Accidents - Characteristics and Associated Injuries
Table B-3: Takeoff Accidents - Characteristicsand Associated Injuries
In these tables, the accident characteristics are grouped as indicated in
Table 5-1. A brief analysis of these tables is given in Section 5 of this
repom.
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APPENDIX C
DC-7 IMPACT TEST
This appendix contains a review of the data in Reference 15 pertaining to the
"Full Scale Dynamic Crash Test of a Douglas DC-7 Aircraft". This test and the
test reported in Reference 16 were outstanding efforts to obtain impact data
vital to assist in the search for safety improvements.
D
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Full-Scale Dynamic Crash Test of a Douglas DC-7 Aircraft (Reference 15)
OBJECTIVES: The purpose of the test was to obtain environmental data to study
fuel containment, and to collect data on the behavior of various components
aboard the aircraft. Separate experiments include the following:
1. Overall acceleration environment
2. Wing fuel spillage studies
3. Cockpit crew seat experiments
4. Cargo restraint experiments
5. Forward cabin fwd facing passenger seating experiment
6. Child restraint experiment
7. Wing center section forward facing passenger seating experiment, and
kick-up load experiment
8. Aft facing passenger seating experiment
9. Galley equipment experiment
10. Air beg restraint experiment
11. Aft cabin fwd facing passenger seating experiment
12. Side facing passenger seating experiment
FACILITY: A special runway was constructed of soil-cement to support the
weight of the aircraft during acceleration. A nose gear guio_ rail was
constructed of a railroad rail laid on a reinforced concrete base. The craft
was accelerated for a distance of 4000 Ft. reaching a velocity of 139 knots at
impact. Impact barriers (in time sequence) were (I) special barriers to
remove the landing gear, (2) an earthen mound for left wing impact and
simulated trees for right wing impact, (3) an 8-degree slope for initial
Fuselage impact, and (4) a 20-degree slope for the final impact.
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INSTRUMENTATION: Sensors included the following:
35 acceleration vectors of fuselage and seats,
10 acceleration vectors of dummy pelvis (5 dummies),
6 pressure (fuel tanks),
13 seat leg leads
5 seat belt loads
1 velocity of aircraft
12 onboard cameras, and
13 exterior cameras
Recording media incuded one 14-channel FM-FM onboard tape recorder with battery
power mounted in a protective box. Subcarrier oscillators were used to allow
7-channels of data to be recorded onto one channel of tape. Two tape channels
were dedicated to tape speed compensation and test time/event correlation.
Cockpit environmental data was gathered VIA a telemetry system. Cameras were
ooerated at 200 and 500 frames/sec. Time correlation was provided by a 100
Hz., .01%, square wave recorded on tape. Correlation between onboard and
exterior cameras was provided by flashbulb.
RESULTS: Aircraft velocity at impact was 15 knots faster than planned. The
right main landing gear rebounded from its barrier and struck the right
horizontal stabilizer, cutting off the outboard section. A blade from No. 3
engine propeller passed through the fuselage causing some structural weakening,
damaging a camera mount, and ripping one of the forward facing seats apart.
The fuselage broke during impact with the 8-degree hill. Both wings failed at
the wingroots. The aircraft impacted the 20-degree hill about 10 feet from
the summit and bounded over the hill. Final impact occurred at the foot of
the hill about 860 feet from the main landing gear barriers. Several small
fires occurred as a result of ruptured fuel and oil lines.
c
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A voltage control regulator failed in the onhoard data recording system
resultin_ in the loss of all electronic data in the onboard recorder. The
telemetry system provided acceleration and force data from the cockpit. Two
camera _ounts failed allowing the cameras to point away from the intended
fields ,f view.
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TEST PROGRAM
This appendix provides an outline of the details of some of the static and
impact tests which are being recommended in Section 12 of the report to assist
- in the simplification and improvement of the accuracy of aircraft structure
impact analyses.
Brief descriptions are given of test purpose, test specimens, test set-up and
the data to be recorded. The tests outlined in Section 1 of this Appendix are
1.1.0 Landing Gear Tests
1.2.0 Fuselage Tests
1.3.0 Seat Tests
Instrumentationand usage is discussed in Section 2 of this appendix.
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1.0 TESTS
1.1.0 Landin9 Gear Tests (Ref. Test 12.2.4.1)J
Purposes
o Correlate static load-deflection characteristics and static
_ strength with response under dynamic loading.
o Determine degree of penetration of gear or supporting
structure into wing or fuselage.
o Obtain characte,'isticload pulse shapes at gear hard points.
o Detemine relationship between impact velocity and angle to
acceleration response at various points on wing structure or
within fuselage.
Specimens
o Landing gear and supporting structure.
o Attached wing section (from rear spar aft) or fuselage
section to the extent feasible.
Test Setl!p
Static.
Load specimen on tower track until fracture or crushing
failure occurs.
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D_vnamlc
Gear drop from drop tower.
Weights to simulate aircraft mass.
Impact onto inclined plane.
IrtGU R,E.. O - I : J _
LAMDtHG G-_AR / Wl/VG y-p_,o P T_T
Data to be recorded t___,,,,,,,, ..... ,,
Specimen type
Weight
Drop height
Impact angle
Accelerometer traces
Strain gauge traces
Pre/post-impactphotos
Motion picture records of failure sequence.
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1.2.0 FUSELAGE TESTS (Ref. Test 12,2.4.2)
Pu_poses
o Determine static force-deflectioncharacteristics.
o Correlate with impact response.
o Determine modes of crushing of underbelly structure.
o Determine net impulse required to bring about a fuselage
": break.
o Determine typical floor acceleration response to
fuselage impact.
o Determine typical seat and occupant acceleration
response.
Specimen
o Fuselage sections, each consisting of a minimum of three
bays in order to account for longitudinal buckling, and
containing:
o Complete floor structure.
o Seats.
o Anthropomorphic dummies (drop tests only),
D-4
1982014353-119
.° _ . ,- ,
APPENDIX D
Test setup
Static
Mount specimen in ground cutout.
Apply loading through cables.
wl • ¢ s! rrlf1_ _f I111 • I#T7
P'IGUAE O-P.. :
FU_LAGEj STATIC cRdSH TEST
Dj/namic
Drop tests.
Suspend specimen from sling.
FIGURE D-3 "
FUSELAGE DROP TEST
_Jwrl'qql#qll/lIT#llrfYw rrwf rr#
Step impact plane in some tests to study fuselage break.
!
I
FIGURE D-4 : Fus_.LAGE 13AEttK TE3T
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Data to be recorded
Specimen type
No. of bays
Weight
Drop height
. Impact area configuration
material (California bearing ratio).
Accelerometer traces at various points
floor
seats
dummies
Pre and post impact still photos
Motion picture records.
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1.3.0 SEAT TESTS (Ref. Tests 12.2.4.3)
P,urposes
Evaluate current static load design criteria.
Correlate static and dynamic response characteristics.
Determine static load-deflection properties.
Specimens
Standard airline seats in two- or three-seat clusters.
Some specimens to include floor, tracks and brackets.
Test dummies.
Test Setup
Static
Loads to be applied in each of the three primary
directions: down, forward and lateral, and in
combinations.
Dynamic
Inertial l_ading to be applied by use of sled facility,
or, if feasible, drop tower.
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Data to be recorded
Specimen descrl ptton
Weight
Load orientation
Impact velocity
Floor or base accelerations
Accelerations at primary structural members
Strains at primary structuralmembers
Motlon picture records of impact sequence history
Sequence photographs of static response
Pre/post test photos.
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2.0 Instrumentatlon
All tests which include planned damage to the test specimen are to be
Instrumented with double or trlple redundancy to assure that, at least,
the critlcal parameters are not lost due to Instrumentatlon component
failures. Thls wi11 Involve dupllcate transducers, where feaslb]_,
dupllcate umblllcals and completely Isolated data recording systems.
Data recordlng media wlll Include a digltaI data system, an analog system
Includl_:g low frequency strlp-chart recorders and hlgh-frequency
osclllographlc recorders, and magnetlc type systems for analog data.
: Umbilical cables, even with judicious use of data mul_+plexers, may not
be deslrable for use on some tests. In these cases _ta telemet y
s)stems will be employed.
Imp,+c Tests
The method commonly used at this facility to record data from impact
tests of short data duration with high data frequencies Is shown
schematically in Figure D-5. The test data is recorded simu!taneous'_ on
oscillographic recorders and magnetic analog tape recorders. Following
the test, the magnetic tape is played back at an appropriate spee#
reduction and the data is digitized and stored on digita_ magnetic tape
for later use In data analys_s. Oscillographic records are used to
determine if the sensors were operating properly, and if tne test
conditions (velocity, attitude, etc.) were In the expected range. The
digital data is used for computations, data presentation, and correlation
with predicted responses.
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zz_z/
./-_TEST VISICORDER
I !/SPECIMEN ._. SIGNAL ....
CONDITIONING
,
t ,
I I
I '
COMPUTER
FIGURE D-5: DATA ACQUISITION SET-UP FOR IMPACT TESTS
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Static Tests
Some static tests may require load and motion control to determine the
force-deflection characteristics of the specimen. A functional diagram of a
typical load and motion control system utilizing the SEL 810A computer is
shown in Figure D-6. Load control is accomplished by the computer acting
, through a closed loop hydraulic system for each loading actuator. A load
command signal is summed with the load transducer response signal in the servo
controller to produce an error signal. This error signal is used by the
controller to drive the hydraulic flow control (servo) valve to produce zero
error. Motion control is accomplished in a similar manner with the motion
transducer.
The data acquisition function (Figure D-7) can be perforaed by Perkin-Elmer
3220 computer and 96 channels of signal conditioning in a unit called a
Portable Test Station (PTS). This system can be used to acquire and process
all quantitative data describing load, deflection and strain. All 96-channels
may be continuously scanned by the computer at a rate of 50 KHz.
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FIGURE D-6: FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM - LOAD AND MOTION CONTROL SYSTEM
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FIGURE D-7: FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM - DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
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Load Measurements
Test loads will be measured with multi-channel strain gaged load cells. These
units are calibrated in both tension and compression before installatlon on a
test and at regular intervals thereafter. Accuracy of these units is within
_1% of full range. Load cell rating wi11 be selected to match maximum
expected load as closely as possible to provide maximum sensitivity.
Strain Measurements
Metal foil, _ectrical resistance, epoxy backed strain gages will be used for
strain measurement. Gage type will be selected to match the thermal
characteristics of the material to which they are bonded. Gages will he wired
in electrical bridge type circuits, using dummy gages for bridge completion as
required by the type of gage installation. Gage circuit resistance will be
measured and recorded for use in determining stress factors. Each gage
installation will be photographed and the record filed in the library. Gages
will then be encapsulated to provide protection against abuse and mmisture.
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Displacement Measurements
A variety of transducers are available for the measurement of displacement.
They include ltnear potentiometers, rotary potentiometers, strain-gaged
bending beams, and linear differential transformers (LVDT).
Acceleration Measurements
The majority of accelerometers will be tri-axial. This is necessary to
accurately record the angular response of the component under test. It is
particularily important for dummy accelerations to be recorded tri-axially :
because of the complex reorientation of the dummy relative to the restraint
system during impact.
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Photographic Coverage
Video tape recordings of the specimen at selected viewing angles will provide
a low speed visual r_cord of the test and to permit instant replay. The video
tape system is too slow to capture the motion initiated at impact, therefore,
high speed motion picture cameras will be required.
Motion picture cameras are available with frame rates from 2 frames/second to
11,000 frames/second. These cameras (16mm) will be located at selected
viewing angles and at selected frames rates to provide redundant coverage.
Cameras operating at high frame rates will be triggered to start recording at
the time of impact (minus a time allowance for the film to reach constant
speed). This is to _ssure that the camera does not run out of film before the
specimen comes to rest.
A major problem with obtaining photocoverage at high frame rates, especially
with color film, is that of providing enough light. Also, light reflections
can obscure the scene. A tradeoff between frame rate and lighting will be
necessary for each test. Light reflectons may be minimized by painting the
specimen.
A grid line background will be provided on and near the specimen within the
cameras field of view for use in data reduction.
Timing marks on the film will be provided with a 10,000 Hz., 0.005%, signal
generator providing timing resolution up to 100 microseconds per "pip"
depending upon frame rate.
Photographic stills will be taken before and after the test as appropriate to
assess the amount of damage.
Onboard cameras may be required on fuselagP tests to monitor selected seat and
dummy motion to determine body flexures and contortions during primary and
secondard i_oact.
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Biological Experiments
It is not believed that animal experiments would be useful in obtaining bone
impact injury data applicable to human subjects. However, physiological
responses such as cardiac and respiratory irregularities may indicate a
closeness to physical incapacitation.
Rats could be used in a protected environment containing air bags or other
energy absorbing material such that bone fractures due to hard impact would
not occur. Electrocardiogram (EKG) and respiration data could be recorded
during _nd following the impact test to (I) determine if physical
incapacitationoccurred and (2) +_ monitor the rate of recovery.
Special instrumentaionfor this type of measurement has been developed and is
used regularly at this facility in fire tests and toxicity experiments. The
onset of cardiac arrhythmia has been found to correlate very closely with
physical incapacitationwhether or nnt in the presence of toxic gas.
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REVIEW OF THE "AIRCRAFT CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE"
Volumes I to V of the "Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide" listed as
References I to 5 have been reviewed and much interesting data contained
therein gave rise to the following comments. These comments are grouped into
the following subjects.
1.0 Structural Design Philesophy
"_ 2.0 Impact Environment J
3.0 Impact Response
4.0 Concepts for Impact Tolerance Improvement
5.0 Design Methods
6.0 Design Requirements and Design Data
E-I
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l.O Structural Design Philosoph,y_
The latest version of the U.S. Army Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide
devotes a 270 page Volume Ill (Referer_ce3) to structural aspects of
impact tolerance and Volume IV (Reference 4) to design of seats,
restraints, litters and padding. The design philosophy expressed divides
the protective function of the structure into two areas: (I) the landing
gear, fuselage and outer structure are to absorb Gs much of the impact as
possible while the fuselage maintains a protective shell about the
occupants, within which no crushing takes place. (2) seats and restraint
: systems serve to keep the occupants within the protective shell and to
limit accelerations imposed on the occupant during the impact sequence.
A third function of structure is to reduce the likelihood of fire and
toxic environment; this topic is treated generally in Volume 5 of the
Design Guide, which is devoted to post impact survival. But from the
viewpoint of protecting the occupant from impact load, the approach is
simply and reasonably expressed: (I) reduce loadings before the occupant
is subjected to them (2) protect from direct impact and have his seat and
restraint system attenuate his accelerations.
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2.0 Crash Environment
There are various levels of generalization at which the definition of
crash design conditions zan he made. The principal approaches are two.
At perhaps the most general level of abstraction, the "design impact" is
defined in terms of velocity changes and terrain conditions; these limits
are placed upon the structure response, in terms of volume reduction,
maximizing G-loading experienced by occupants, maintenance of post impact
egress, etc. The Design Guide (Reference 3, Page 56) contains a summary
of such an approach under the heading of "Performance Requirements"
(reproduced in Table E-I).
The second major point of departure for design definition is to provide
acceleration pulse shapes for certain critical structural components, and
to place design limits upon their dynami: response. This is an approach
which is more in line with the tradition of specifications for aircraft
structures, where usually the only significant difference being that
dynamic rather than static loading is specified. The Design Guide
contains a number of specifications of this type. For acceleration,
input or idealized triangular pulses are imposed at the cabin floor level
near the aircraft center of gravity. A summary is given in Table E-2 and
the Design Guide recommends that these pulses be used for the design of
restraint systems, seats, cargo restraint and other items inside the
aircraft. The acceleration pulse conditions were derived by estimation
from accident investigations of crashes over the periods 1960-65 and
1970-76.
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TABLEE-l: PERFORMANCER QUIRENENTSFORSTRUCTURALIMPACTTOLERANCE
va|oclty Vehicle Percentage
Impact 1repeated d/ftersnttsl attitude vo 1uSes Other htl
4_rect.lon _ lit/sac) |lm_ts rod¥¢t _on roouiresu*nt s sovr¢0
LongitudLna| Rigid 20 NO hazard Does not lo,_ _3 postcrash Voluu4 ||
to pLlotl ogress
copilot
40 IS JLaa. In_Jr4 bvckllng st side NIL-STDoI2J0
length re- vails should not pose vo|w_ II
due; ion for hessrds
pals./troop
comFar tsmnt
Lateral Rigid 30 t20" Yaw 15 max. Lateral collapse of so- NIL-8?D-;200
width cupied areas not haserd- Vol_se IS
reduction sue. NO entrapment of
llabs.
Vertical Rigid 42 .25"/-15" 15 _z. G loads not £n_urtous to NIL-BTDolZg0
Pitch height red. occupants Volume I|
t20" ftoll In pass./
troop coe-
perts_nt
Ires;leant Ktgld 50 Combination As above NOz. velocity chengest NIL-|TDo12pO
for various long. - S0 ftlsec Volume XZ
components wart. • 42 ft/8oc_
let. $0 ft/oec_ a
25 tt/oec-
_llover zarth 90" sideward Ntnimal Forward fuselage buried to NX/.oIJTD-;310
or It0* in- (door depth of 2 in. (Inverted or
vetted or hatches etc. on alde). Lo6d unLformllr
any Inter- assumed tO d_ktribated over forward
mediate &_gle be non-load 25t of Occupied ful_l_
carrying) length. Can sustelo 4 G
without /n3ury to seated
and rwatrstnad CM_JMUmtO.
All loadSng dir_tio_ be-
tween normJl sad I_tsllel
t_o skin to be considered.
i_Ilover (post- p2g_ t'_o 360" IS nan. NI_-ITDoI29g
Lapser) roils (an.) volume re-
duction (St
desired)
Earth plowing I_tth - Preclude plowing when for- RIL-rto-1290
& scooping ward 25t of f_solago has
(longitudinal) uniformly epl%Ied vertic_Jl
load of 10 G and res_nzd
load of 4 G or the die©h°
Xng loads Of NIL-A-OO|OSSA.
whichever Is the greatest.
Landing gear ItxgLd 20 aloe Roll Hone. Pies- Aircrs_et docelerstioel st N|Ir-aTO-IlgO
aloe Pxtch tic deforma- normal G.N. for Impact
tion of gear with no fuselage to g_xud
end mounting contact. All other ;tic
.....l. ,*ru,ursl,rts.lovable blades, should be -
_orthy fo| |owns 4 crosb.
Landing gear Sod 100 long. c _" Pt_ch IS _u. NO reliever, or If reliever NIL-rtD-12tg
14 were. SIC" POl| v¢luJ_e re- occurs, two 360" rolls
t20" _sw duction (St without fuselage crushing Volume 21
des t red )
S) Llqht f;aud-wing err©raft, 8track and ca, rgo helicopters.
b) Other hal;cot)tars.
C) #el_c*Ly it*- ;mpsr.t, not differential.
(REFERENCE3, PAGE 56)
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TABLE E-2: SUMMARY OF IMPACT CONDITIONS FOR HELICOPTERS AND
LIGHT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Impact Pulse
DirectIon VelocIty Peak Duration,
(Aircraft Change, Av Acceleration A t
Axes) M/S (Ft/Sec) (G) (Sec) Corcments
Longitudinal 15 (50) 30 0.104 Triangular
(Cockpit) deceleration
_: pulse:
_ Gpeak
Longitudinal 15 (50) 24 0.13 m At I I
(Cabin) r--
Vertical 13 (42) 48 0.054
Lateral 8 (25)a 16 0.097 t calcu-
Iated from
9 (30)b 18 0.104 known or
assumed
values for
Gpeakand v:
At
a) Light fixed-wingaircraft, attack and cargo helicopters.
b) Other helicopters.
(REFERENCE 3, PAGE 47)
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Wlth the floor-acceleratlon-pulse-speclflcatlons approach, another
essential Ingredlent where the occupant response Is concerned Is data for
human tolerance level. As dlscu_sed elsewhere In thls report, thls data
appears to be scattered, sometimes contradlctory and usually llmlted to
an idealized occupant (the army aviator). Nevertheless, It helps to
define the deslgner's objec(Ive conflnlng hls job to provide
occupant-protectlon devices _o keel) response wlthln tolerable levels,
given specified input acceleratlons/
In developing design requirements and procedures for civtllat_ transport
category airplanes, the starting p_lnts wtll be the same as _:ho_? faken
In the Design Guide. Overall definition of tmpact cnndtttons _tll
encompass either velocity changes (along wtth airplane attitude at impact
and terrain conditions) or prescribed acceleration pulses Actual
values for transports must certainly be different from thos_ for any
helicopters, and must be established from the -esults of extensive test
programs.
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3.0 Impact Response
The Design Guide contains a general description of structural damage
which frequently results in occupant injury (Reference 3, Page 51).
Longitudinal loads are first experienced by the forward and lower parts
of the fuselage. Earth scooping enhances loads at the forward fuselage
and often causes collapse. Breakup of more structure causes it _u be
pulled beneath the rest of the airplane and results in higher
longitudinal acceleration than would be otherwise experienced. Landing
gear is not effective in absorbing crash energy.
Vertical impact loads on the fuselage shell are enhanced by large mass
items attached high on the fuselage. Excessively high impact loads
limits for the lower fuselage structure will result in transmission of
high vertical accelerations to occupant, causing compressive spinal
injuries.
High lateral loading is a frequent occurrence in military helicopter
accidents, but would probably be of less serious concern for large
transports. An important design considerations is to restrain the
occupant from contact with the fuselage shell.
Bending loads on the fuselage shell occur in impacts at high impact
angles and cause rupture of the fuselage, exposing some occupants to
direct contact with jagged metal and loss of restraint.
Floor buckling can reduce the effectiveness of seats. The energy-
absorbing mechanisms of the seat (usually effected by some form of
plastic yielding) should come into play neither too early nor too late in
the impact sequence. A well-designed seat attempts to be load limiting,
but the seat response depends upon the response of the occupant as well
(Reference4, Page 20). A typical picture of seat-occupant response is
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shown in Figure E-1 for a "load-limited seat". It is seer that the seat pan
acceleration response and the occupant acceleration response curves oscillate
about the limit-load factor. These dynamic over_hoot phenomena require
analysis by seat occupant response codes, and considerable testing in order to
develop an effective seat design.
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FIGURE E-I: TYPICAL SEAT PAN, DUMMY CHEST, A_ ,._MMY
PELVIS RESPONSE TO VERTICAL IMPAC',_OADING
(FROM REFERENCE 4)
4.5 / v i , I 1 i I I I I
,j---initial spike _ Input pulse (heavy solid)I
_r_ i? _ --Vertical seat pan (solid)
-o_ Vertical dummy chest (dotted)
----Vertical dummy pelvis (dashed)"
i i I
-----Secondary spike I
o ZI_Fk _-_-J
J__ I I'" I
--Initial notch --Secondary notch
I I I !
-15 ....
0 0.05 0.i0 0.15
Time, sec
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4.0 Conceptsfor ImpactTolerance Improvement
The Design Guide discusses a number of devices and concepts for
structural design to improve impact tolerance.
Design for breakaway of wing and empennage under high impact loading is
recommended so that the high forces otherwise needed to remove their
kinetic energy during the impact need not be transmitted through the
fuselage. This would t_nd to reduce the accelerations experienced by
occupants. Wing removal also provides the means of leaving flammable
fuels well behind the fuselage (Reference 3, Page 149).
Breakaway of landin_ _ear has little effect on fuselage loading; the
principal concern with gear breakaway is in controlling its trajectory in
order to avoid penetration of fuel tanks.
Design considerations for fuel tanks are listed at Reference 3,
Page 152. These are primarily concerned with reducing the likelihood of
rupture.
Recommendation is made that large mass items be kept from position high
in the fuselage so that sidewall collapse would be lessened and the
possibility of the upper fuselage dropping upon occupants would be
reduced (Reference 3, Page 133). In this regard, low-wing configurations
should be more impact tolerant than high-wing configurations.
The analysis given in the Design Guide (Reference 3, Page 116) indicates
the effect of earth plowin9, where the crash involves the scooping of
soft earth which is driven to the velocity of the aircraft. The effect
en the average acceleration is said to be
mE Vo
a mA+m E • At
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where mA is the aircraft mass, mE the mass of scooped earth, Vo the
initial impact velocity (longitudinal)and _t the impact duration. Thus
reducing mE will reduce the acceleration. (The formula given is not
valid for small mE/mA since the limit value is zero.) The Design
Guide also gives a formula for mE:
mE = KAVo_t where K is constant and A is the cross section area of
the earth gouge. This formula is given without any verification.
In any case, it is clear that earth scooping increases longitudinal
loads. The Design Guide recommends a strong nose structure so as to
prevent the formation of a "scoop", Figure (E-2). Actually,
consideration of this design involves a tradeoff between on-runway and
off-runway situations. For crash landings on the runway, which are
probably the predominant type of survivable crash condition, designing
for collapse of the lower fuselage is preferable tc keeping it rigid.
C
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j FIGURE Eo2: METHOD OF REINFORCING NOSE STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE INCREASED
RESISTANCE TO VERTICAL LOADS AND TO REDUCE EARTH SCOOPING
'_ (REFERENCE 3, PAGE 125)
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Various fuselage design concepts (illustrated in Figures E-3 and E-4) are
directed toward reducing plowing, absorbing energy by crushing of the
underbelly and keeping floor, sidewall and exits intact. In transports,
use of foam and other types of reliable material (Figure E-5) would
involve a very expensive reduction of cargo space. More appropriate
would be consideration of concepts which utilize the energy absorbing
capability of lower fuselage cargo.
Various energy absorbing devices are illustrated which involve metal
working, (Figure E-6). These devices appear to be the most efficient
from the point of view of specific energy absorption (energy absorbed per
unit weight), but the unidirectional nature of their effectivity limits
the potential areas of their application. The Design Guide notes that
"some may be included in the primary aircraft structure to help control
the deformation sequence during a crash; however, none are applicable for
use as major structural members, such as beams," (Reference 3, Page 99)
Essentially, these devices will find application as local limiting struts
in seats and other restraint systems.
The Specific Energy Absorption (SEA) of materials is an important measure
of their usefulness for structural crashworthiness. The material SEA,
which is related to ductility, is the area under the stress strain
diagram, divided by the specific weight. Figure E-7 illustrates the
tremendous advantage of metal over composites. The Design Guide at
Reference 3, Pages 81-97 contains a good overall discussion of the
potential for composites in crashworthy design, and seems to show that
the advantages which these material_ offer in terms of strength-to-weight
ratio are offset by their poor SEA capability. The Design Guide suggests
use of components in crushable beams and bulkheads (Figure E-8) and in
tubular items designed specifically for vertical impact energy absorption
(Figure E-5).
The low capability of composites to resist and distribute concentrations
of stress seems to require adjunct use of metals in joints and fastenings.
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Reinforced exits
vStrong rollover \
_tructure \
' Energy- __ _
absorbing
construction
under fuselage [[,=Fj/ _,___ !I} SJ] ]
Local strap / {Strong floor for
reinforcement -/ seat attachment
Frangible fittings provide Seats and other
for jettisonable equipment nonbreakaway equip-
which will not impinge into rment provided with
crew compartment /filament-wound
__ / secondary equipment
Sandwich-stiffened
ring frames prevent
inward buckling
Side fillets
prevent inward_ II
buckling
frames
Squared
corners provide
lateral energy 30 ° Vertical impact
absorption for impact
oblique impact
FIGURE E-3: OVERALL FUSELAGE CONCEPTS. (FROM REFERENCE 3, PAGE 89)
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Ifll,I _i *[olO li | ,l,_
(a) (b) \_J
Circular cross section to Strong sidewall to prevent
reduce rollover loads protective shell failure
(c) (d)
Redundant sidewall frames Crushable material for load
for rollover loads control and distribution
FIGURE E-4: FUSELAGE SIDEWALL CONCEPTS - LATERAL IMPACT
(FROM REFERENCE 3, PAGE 94)
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Kevlar straps maintain
structural integrity
and react side loads
/ tubes provide
vertical and
lateral energy
30 ° lmpac__ absorption
"Vertical impact
(a)
No foam in center
Corrugated Kevlar section for controls
semi-tube provides routing
vertical and lateral /
energy absorption _ /" / LOuter tubes may be
_ 1_ _/ IIlll_/ foam filled for an
_>_,_[ _ 'i_,_i'// additional absorption
c pability
(bl
Filament-wound sandwich
double-tube substructure
around crushable core provides
vertical and lateral energy absorption
_ \ | IHoneycomb or
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_k________ --/_ additional
%[_.d.I,.-'.. ...... 'I S,hh ' vertical and
_lJl[lll._ _I_IIiIJ_ lateral energy
[ _"0 o impact
Vertical impact
(c)
FIGURE E-5: ENERGY-ABSORPTION CONCEPTS - TUBULAR CONSTRUCTION (OBLIQUE
VERTICAL IMPACT) (FROM REFERENCE 3, PAGE 92)
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Outer tube .Inner tube 7
_1_"__ Roll.er. ..... :. /
Z /Wire _/Slot in inner tube
(a) wire bending - absorbs energy by plastic bending
of wire over rollers
Outer tube__ _._ .........
............. .,.,..
Thin-wailed metal roll tub_ \Plastically
_deforming
(roll) region
(b) Inversion tube - absorbs energy by inverting
a thin-walled tube
Wire helix _ Outer __.
(c) Roiling torus - absorbs energy by rclling wire
helix between concentric tubes
,f De for_d
housing
by plastic spreading of the
pulley housing
FIGURE E-6: EXAMPLES OF ENERGY-ABSORBINGDEVICES (REFERENCE 3, PAGE 100)
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200
ml.
,; _ Energy-absorption ratio - A707------_5- 12.3
AGIE15o
x
ioo / A7075
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g
0 • ,
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Strain (in./in.)
FIGURE E-7: STRESS-STRAIN RELATIONSHIP FOR ALUMINUM ALLOY (7075) and 0
DEGREES GRAPHITE/EPOXY COMPOSITE (REFERENCE 3, PAGE 85)
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Deformation of _olnts is a serious concern in design of impact tolerant
seats, and the B_sign Guide Volume IV (probably the best available work
on seat design) devotes careful and rational attention to this problem.
Inadequate performance of floor structure by excessive warpage, and of
floor to seat connections by transmission of bending and torsion moments
can void a well-designed seat. Figures (Reference 4, pages 56, 57, 58,
59, 60) illustrate concepts for joint design to effect release of moments
or torques so ac not to block the load alleviation devices which may be
designud into the seat.
A review of design concepts for impact tolerant seats indicates that they
should be designed as mechanisms as well as structure: their kinematics
during impact response should be predictable. This means that floor and
base structure should not deform substantially; the seat response should
be a linkage motion with most links remaining rigid and the energy
absorption function produced by specific links or connections. In
particular all designs, specific hinges or struts absorb the energy by
some form of plastic working o_ metal. Serious design problems are
presented when force components are presented in all three principal
directions and the stroking function may be impaired due to binding.
The seat design section of the Design Guide contains a comprehensive
review of tke use of "stroking" devices which have predictable load
limiting and energy absorbing capabilities. It would appear that _hese
devices, which already find application in all military crew seats, offer
much potential for improving occupant protection.
The Design Guide addresse_ the problem of providing different
load-limiting seat capability, depending on occupant weight, and
indicates that this goal would be achieved by active or passive devices.
Recommendation is made that variable limit-load energy absorbers be
incorporated in all new (military) impact tolerant seat systems
(Reference 4, Pages 92 and 93).
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Beams and bulkheads must
provide progressive collapse
and energy absorption and
_---react vertical, longitudinal
_\ and lateral impact loads
'- urai floor removed)
/syiefep
/ salns by
/adding
/plies
_ii_ od_ ns_ _--j _i: evlar_FOa" Or
De _ face f<<,_:.._balsa
heat _ _,',';_c-.re
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FIGURE E-8: ENERGY-ABSORPTIONCONCEPTS - BEAMS AND BULKHEADS
(VERI!CAL IMPACT) !FROM REFERENCE 3, PAGE 91)
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The Design Guide is mute on the subject of the relative merits of
backward versus forward facing seats, a subject which clearly deserves
the attention of engineers having a serious concern for the impact
tolerance of transport aircraft.
Use of seat cushions for load alleviation appear_ to be impractical
(Reference 4, Page 127); rather, their function should be to provide
comfort and load distribution. Energy absorption considerations indicate
that seat cushions of thickness rather less than those in current
civilian aircraft are in _rder, because the motion of the pelvis relative
to the seat bracket should be minimized (Reference 4 Page 128).
Cushioning materials are recomm nded for the reduction of secondary
impact injuries, in particular, head injury. These materials can serve
to absorb energy as well as to distribute the impact from over a larger
area (Reference4, Page 219).
Restraint systems are treated in Section 7 of Reference 4 of the Design
Guide. For troop/passenger seats the Guide recommends systems which
include upper torso restraint (Figure E-9). These restraint systems
should be designed to hold occupants in the 95th percentile survivable
accident. Cargo restrain sxstems (nets and lines) are to sustain got,.
percentile i_pacts, defined by a triangular impact pulse of 16 G peak
(Reference 4, Page 161).
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4 \
Type I Type II
Item identity
i. Inertia reel
2. Shoulder strap
3. Lap belt anchor
4. Buckle with shoulder strap connection
5. Lap belt
6. Adjuster/fitting
FIGURE E-9: AIRCRAFT TROOP/PASSENGER RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
(REFERENCE 4, PAGE 135)
E-22
T
1982014353-154
IAPPENDIX E
5.0 Design Methods
Design techniques of various levels of sophistication and complexity appear
in the Design Guide. Kinematics of the most elementary sort are described
(Reference 3, Page 169) and applied to illustrate the properties of various
idealized pulse shapes. Formulas and charts are provided which relate
• stopping distance to average deceleration (Reference 3, Page 182) and to
peak accelerations for various pulse shapes (Reference 3, Page 190).
Elementary work-energy principles are derived (Reference 3, Page 174).
These energy methods can be efficient and powerful means of gaining a basic
u_dersta_ding of impact phenomena as illustrated by analyses of earth
plowing effects (Reference 3, Page 116) and of seat stroking (Reference 4,
Pages 70-81). A useful formula for determining required seat stroke
distance is given at Reference 4, Page 76.
Lan__dling gear design methodology is described at Reference 3, Page 195.
This discussion is rather elementary a,d neglects the fact that side
loading which occurs during taxi is usually a critical design condition for
the gear structure in large transport airplanes.
A number of digital computer programs for simulating structural response in
the impact environment are reviewed briefly at Reference 3, Pages 225-242.
Attention is given to KRASH, DYCAST and WRECKER (discussed elsewhere in
this report) but little attempt is made to indicate the degree of
confidence with which a design engineer could rely on them. For potential
users of KRASH, a very important treatment of means of developing
t structural properties is given at Reference J, Pages 203-224, but the
intelligentuse of impact simulation programs still appears to be rather an
esoteric craft which can be learned only through long and painful
experience. The Design Guide discussions, although somewhat obscure, is an
impu,'tantstep in the direction of helping the average structural engineer
in the use of these complex codes.
E-23
1982014353-155
APPENDIX E
Various seat occupant computer programs are reviewed at Reference 4,
Page 93 et seq., again without supplying much in the way of experimental
verification.
Testin9 is discussed at Reference 3, Page 243 in the context of providing
basic structural data for impact analysis. A study by Holmes and Colton
(Reference 6, Pages 561-582) is reported which indicates that scale models
can cut the cost of testing in half for prototype structures in the
1000-10000 Ib range.
Volume IV of the Design Guide contains a detailed list of static test
requirements for impact tolerant seats (Reference 4, Page 182) as well as
requirements for dynamic tests if substituted for static tests (Reference 4
Pages 189 and 190). A useful list of references to ASMT test methods for
flexible cellular plastics is provided at Reference 4 Page 228.
6.0 Design Requirements and Design Data
The design engineer's activity requires data in the form of material
properties, geometries, conditions, and it also demands design objectives.
To these ends, the Design Guide illustrates how these needs might be
filled, and to what extent they remain unfilled. The "performance
requirements" for impact tolerant structures (Table E-I) gives specific
impact conditions which define the basis for design. Design impact
velocity changes are provided, and it is specified that these velocity
changes are assumed to occur on a rigid surface and with a triangular
acceleration-time Rulse shape. Generally, the pulse duration does not
appear to be specified (and thus the peak acceleration level cannot be
given), but this is reasonable since the duration depends to some extent on
the particular structure involved. However, specific floor load pulses are
given (Figure E-IO) and this means that the designer of seats, cargo tie
downs and other important protective systems has a basis to work from. It
is noted that these are dynamic load conditions, rather than static.
Static load requirements are specified for seats and cargo restraint
systems, as discussed below.
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It is to be emphasized that the specific acceleration pulses probably
cannot be carried over unchanged for use in transport aircraft design. As
noted earlier, the large transport by its very size places a great deal of
yielding structure between impact plane and floor; thus peak loads should
probably be lower for the sa,_ impact defined in terms of velocity changes.
Percentile _ 95th 90th 85th 50th
,m
Cockpit area
A
Cabin area
_v _ /ft 50
FIGURE E-IO: AIRCRAFT FLOOR LONGITUDINAL PULSES FOR ROTARY - AND LIGHT
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT (REFERENCE 3, PAGE 160)
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Design requirements for impact tolerant seats and for energy absorbing
cargo restraint systems appear to be very specific: the load-deflection
curves must have particular characteristics, as illustrated in Figure
E-11. An acceptable design must have a load deflection curve which rises
_ to the left of and above a specified "base curve", and which attains its
ultimate load above a specified "minimum acceptable load curve". These
loads are static loads, which have been determined from dynamic calculation
based on specific input tloor pulses (e.g. 30G peak triangular pulse of
15.2 m/s (50 ft/sec) velocity change in the cockpit and 24G peak with 15.2
m/s (50 ft/sec velocity) change in the cabin area for the forward load,
(Reference 4 Page 169). The design requirements for cargo restraint are
similar in form to those for seats. (Figure E-12).
The Design Guide recommends both static and dynamic seat testing and
presents proposed test requirements as well as useful recommendations as to
how the tests should be conducted (Reference 4, Pages 181-195). Figure
E-13 shows the requirements for dynamic testing of seats. Requirements are
also given for research/developmentwhich involve off-axis accelerations.
Particular anthrophomorphic dummies are to be used; with weights
representing pilot/copilot or troop/gunner (with gear). For civilian
transport applications, it would probably be necessary to modify the given
values.
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FIGURE E-f1: SEAT FORWARD LOAD AND DEFLECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL TYPES
OF ARMY AIRCRAFT (FORWARD DESIGN PULSE)
(REFERENCE 4, PAGE 170)
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FIGURE E-i2: LOAD-DISPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ENERGY-ABSORBING CARGO
RESTRAINT SYSTEMS (FORWARD LOADING OF ROTARY-WING AND
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT) (REFERENCE 3, PAGE 162)
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'Tlswma aec
Cabini Cockpit seats saata
i
Test Configuration Parameter Qualification R&D Quallficatlon I R&D
Dummy
inertial t i sac 0.036 0.020 050 .0281 load
t 2 sac 0.051 0.051 .074 .074
I G mln 46 46 32 32
G max 51 $1 37 37
Av m_Ln, ft/sec 42 42 42 42
p,
utility and obser-
2a vatlon helicopters t, sac 0.062 10.036 .062 .036
Dungy t2 sac 0.104 0.104 .104 .104
inertial G mln 16 16 IS 16load
G max 21 21 21 21
_v min, ft/sec 30 )0 30 30
Light fixed-winq,
2b cargo and attack t I leo 0.057 0.033 .057 .033he1 Icopters
l Dummy t 2 sac 0.I00 0,I00 .I00 .I00
linertial G m_n 14 14 14 14
Iload
_ G max 19 19 19 19
,_v Irxn, ft/sac 25 25 25 2S
] t 1 mac 0.066 0.0.18 .0ll .046
,.., Dun,my
i_ inertial t2 sac o.1oo o.1oo .127 .127
load
G min 20 21 22 22
!/j c max 33 32 27 27
AV laln, ft/sec S S0 50 50
FIGURE E-13: REQUIREMENTS OF DYNAMIC TESTS IF SUBSTITUTED FOR SIATIC TESTS
(REFERENCE 4, PAGE 189)
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Static strength requirements for ancillary equipment and component
attachments are specified in the Design Guide at Reference 3, Page 154 and
Reference 4, Page 195. These static strength requirements, shown in
Table E-3, are probably very conservative (Reference 4, Page 195) and if
applied to items of substantial mass, "significant weight penalties may be
incurred or the available supporting structure may not be capable of
withstanding the anticipated loads" (Reference 3, Page 154). Probably a
more realistic approach would be to lay down requirements in terms of
maintaining attachment under specified base acceleration pulses. These
would be satisfied by analysis or testing.
The Design Guide contains a sprinkling of tables and charts of very useful
design data (an index of this could be very helpful for the designer).
Examples:
o Crippling allowables for aluminum extrusions and formed sections,
Reference 3, Page 216 and 217.
o Material properties of selected flexible cellular polymers,
Reference 4, Page 226 et seq.
o Ignition conditions for abraded metal particles, Reference 3, Page 98.
o Restraint webbing characteristics, Reference 4, Page 150.
Finally, the Guide contains an extensive but carefully selected list of
references to technical works and each volume of the Guide is graced with
an index.
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TABLE E-3: STATIC LOAD REQUIREMENTS FOR
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT ATTACHMENTS
(REFERENCE3, PAGE 154)
Downward 50G
Upward lOG
"; Forward 35G
Aftward 15G
Sideward 25G
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HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT
This appendix contains a discussion of human tolerance limits to loads
experienced in aircraft impacts. Indices and criteria applicable to spine
loading and head impact are given prime concern. The tolerance test data
appears to apply only to military personnel although Figure F-5 gives an
indication of the variation of the tolerance limits for a wide range of ages for
the flying public.
C
The discussion on humJn tolerance limits and index indicators covers the
following:
1.0 Dynamic Response Index
2.0 Other Spinal Models
3.0 Head Injury Criteria
4.0 Leg Injury Criteria
5.0 Off-Axis Acceleration
6.0 Shock Spectra
7.0 Flailing Distance and Volume Reduction
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1.0 Dynamic Response Index (DRI)
The "Dynamic Respcnse Index" is a simple measure of spinal :nJ,ry severity
resulting from short duration acceleration applied in "he upward, vertical
direction +Gz (to compress the spine). The index is the output of a
one-degree-of-freedom spring-mass-damper oscillator whose parameters have
been determined from vibration and impact tests of human subjects _nd
cadavers. This model is embodied in a single equation
governing the compressive deformation_ of the vertcbral column. The input
z is the applied vertical acceleration (e.g., at the seat bucket). The
parameters nf the system are
LO , the natural frequency
O) z = k/m where
k = stiffness
m = mass
= damping ratio
For a given input acceleration pulse _. The maxirum deformation _ max.
determines the Dynamic Response Index (DRI)
DRI : mr
where g is the gravitational acceleration 9.81 m/s2 (32.2 ft/sec.2).
Thus the DRI is a measure of the peak acceleration response level.
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The DRI model has been shown to correlate with spinal injury rate in
aircraft seat ejection studies (Figure F-I). It has the advantages of
simplicity and ease of incorporation into aircraft impact response computer
programs of the finite element or lumped mass variety, such as KRASH,
DYCAST, ACTION, SOMLA, etc.
For design of adjustable, upward, aircraft seat ejection systems,
MIL-S-g47gB (USAF) uses
_k_ = 52.9 radius/sec.
o = 0.224
In application of the Dynamic Response Index, is should be borne in mlnd
that the model is Jseful in predicting spinal injury and compression
loading, such as would be expected in seat ejection response or perhap: in
aircraft impact: where the occupant is restrained by a shoulder ha ness.
However, the typical airline passenger impact position (body folded
forward, lap belt restraint) will usually develop extensional loading of
the spine; and here DRI application may be questionable.
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50- Operational data / /
_uc 20-4 30.-- Cadaver data////
/5°,10-
'-' / IoA5"
•r-_ 1- /_'J/
"'_ O. 5-
,-I
0.2
I I I I I ! I
i0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Dynamic Response Index
Aircraft type Nonfatal e_ections
A* 64
B* 62
C 65
D* 89
E 33
F 48
*Denotes rocket catap_llt
FIGURE F-l: EXPERIMENTALVERIFICATION OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE INDEX
(REFERENCE2, PAGE 66)
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2.0 Other Spinal Models
Elaboration on the principles underlying the Dynamic Response Index model
leads to detailed, multi-degree-of-freedom models of the spine, with
individual vertebra treated as rigid bodies connected by deformable
elements. King and Prasad have developed a 78 Qegree of freedom model
which simulates spinal motion in the mid sagittal plane (the body plane of
"symmetry"). (J. Appl. Mech. 4, 3 546-550, 1974). Belytschko, et. al.
have developed a three-dimensional model which includes vertebrae, pelvis,
head and ribs. (USAF AMRL TR-76-10, 1976). Summaries of these two models
are repeated by Laanenen in Reference 2, Page 67.
Used by themselves, these models promise much utility for predicting
details of spinal response, but they would appear to require a fairly
complex and sophisticated data base as well as a well-correlated means of
inferring spinal injury potential from their output. It is not clear
whether such means currently exist. Moreover, the demands made by
multi-degree-of-freedom biomechanical subcomponent models upon computer
core and processing time would tend to rule out their incorporation into
general aircraft impact evaluation computer programs, at least at present.
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3.0 Head In_ur_.Criteria
Studies of head impact tolerances have resulted in a number of injury
criteria. Reference I, Page 48 identifies four different types:
, peak G
peak transmitted force
Severity Index (SI)
Head Injury Criterion (HIC)
: The "Wayne Curve" has been developed at Wayne State University from
extensive study with cadavers and animals. This criterion shown in
Figure F-2 is intended to show impact tolerance for the human brain in
forehead impacts against plane, unyielding surfaces. The tolerable level
depends upon both acceleration and duration.
The Severitx Index developed by Gadd is a single number which was proposed
to account for the relatively higher dependence of injury on acceleration
as _gainst duration. Fr_,_1a history a(t) of head acceleration in impact
from time to to time tf (in seconds), the index is calculated by
-tfSI = a/g n dtt
o
where a/g is the acceleration in g's.
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FIGURE F-2: WAYNE STATE TOLERANCE CURVE FOR THE HUMAN BRAIN
IN FOREHEAD IMPACTS AGAINST PLANE, UNYIELDING
SURFACES. (REFERENCE 2, FIGURE 15)
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The exponent n is a number greater than one, and when taken at 2.5
results in an injury criterion whereby an SI of 1000 gives the upper
bound of survival and 700 predicts moderate injury. It is readily
apparent that the severity index cannot be applied for long-duration
acceleration histories, since it would indicate injury from very low
. levels uf acceleration; e.g., fatality from 1000 sec at Ig.
The Head Injury Criterion (HIC) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 is related to the SI but is somewhat more complicated in application.
where tI and t2 are any two points (t2 > tl) in the acceleration
history.
Head injury is probably of particular concern in impact studies of
transport aircraft where passengers are restrained only by lap belts, and
respond to airplane longitudinal deceleration by rotating the upper body
about the restraint, imp,cting into facing seat backs. Applicatior of
head ira#actinjury criteria would require use of an occupant response
model to predict the skull-seatback impact velocity, as well as carefully
constructed data base relating impact velocity to acceleration pulses
experience in the head impact event. This data base :_ouldprobably be
obtained experimentally.
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APPENDIX F
'" 4.0 Le9 Injury Criteria
For the same reasons discussed above, transport impact study demands a
criterion for tolerance of the lower leg to impact. Snyder's compre-
hensive survey* states that only four studies are known and all are
unpublished. Here also, the impact criterion would probably require
occupant response dynamic analysis in order to define impact velocities
and associated acceleration pulses..
*R. G.Snyder, SAE 700398, p. 1400, Human Impact Tolerance"
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5.0 Off-Axis Acceleration
There has been little if any study of injury tolerance in situations where
the body acceleration vector does not lie along one of the principal
(x, y, z) body axes, i.e., where the "G vector" has components Gx, Gy,
G of which more than one is nonzero. The "natural" engineering
• Z
approach would be a criterion based on vectorial combination of the
relative injury measures in each direction:
@
where GxL, GyL GzL are limit allowable values for each direction.
The Air Force uses this criterion for ejection seat design, but modifies
it in cases where Gz is positive (spinal compression) by replacing the
z-component by the Dynamic Response Index:
/'°xl f_t,_l / ] '" <'[ ,}+ +t xq
(MIL-S-9479B,USAF). For the limit values the specification is
DRIL = {18 if I Gz / GL < tan 50
16 otherwise
and the values GxL, GyL, GzL depend upon their durations (Figure
F-3 shows the relation for GxL),
This criterion has the advantage of simplicity of application but derives
from an arbitrary means of combining the effects of orthogonal components
i of the nonorthogonal acceleration vector, which lacks experimental
, verification.
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4APPENDIX F
6.0 Shock Spectra
In 1967, Fitzgibbon and Vollmer* proposed a methoo for measuring the
severity of an impact acceleration transient, which is based on response
spectra. The proposed severity index is the ratio of two functions:
(i) the "shock spectrum" of the particular acceleration history and (2) a
"human tolerance" curve of acceleration versus frequency. The human
tolerance curves (Figure F-4) were derived from then-existing criteria
for acceleration vs pulse duration. The shock spectra of a particular
acceleration history is the graph versus frequency of the maximum
,__ acceleration response of a single degree of freedom system with that
natural frequency (and prescribed damping ratio), when subjected to the
input acceleration transient in question. Thus the ratio of these two
spectra, itself a function of frequency, is a measure of the degree of
"injury potential" in a particular impact pulse.
The shock spectra approach provides a means of making organized sense out
of impact records, and would be of use in the development of design
criteria for seats and other components. Because of its limitation to
linear systems it seems to have been ignored in application to structures
experiencing large deformation. But the idea of using a "severity index"
which is the ratio of output acceleration spectrum (calculated in a
simulation code or measured in an impact test) to an established "human
tolerance spectrum" remains a viable and attractive approach.
D. D. Fitzgibbon and R. P. Vollmer, "Crash Loads Environment Study", FAA
contract FA 66 WA-1511, Report DS-67-2 (1967).
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7.0 Flatlin 9 Distance and Volume Reduction
An indicator of the possibility of impact of the occupant with hard
structure in his vicinity is the surface defined by all the points which
his extremities could reach. Thus a design concern is whether hard
' structure may be found within that surface. This can be decided without
simulating impact dynamics.
An occupant response code will have the position of the occupant in an
accident, and will indicate contacts which he makes. The computation of
the contact forces on in_)actdoes not seem to be within the capacity of
present-day occupant response programs.
When the occupant is surrounded by a defined structural surface, such as
a cockpit, the reduction of its volume in an accident is another qualita-
tive indicator of injury potential. Clearly a drastic volume reduction
indicates certainty of injury, but there does not appear to he any
quantitative means of generally correlating volume reduction and injury
potential.
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